History of the AN/UYK-20(V) data processing system acquisition and its impact on tactical systems development. by Joyce, Robert Richardson
HISTORY OF THE AN/UYK-20(V) DATA PROCESSING










HISTORY OF THE AN/UYK-20(V) DATA PROCESSING




Thesis Advisors; S. Jauregul & E. Zabrycki
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Prepared for:









2. GOVT ACCESSION NO
READ INSTRUCTIONS
BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subittlal
HISTORY OF TEE AN/UYK-20(V) DATA
PROCESSING SYSTEM ACQUISITION AND
ITS IMPACT ON TACTICAL SYSTEMS
DEVELOPMENT
S. Tvpr QJ* .REPORT ft PERIOD COVEREO
Master's Thesis;
(September 1976)
«. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR!"*)
Robert Richardson Joyce
». CONTRACT OR GRANT NLMlCArtj
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME ANO ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA ft WORK UNIT NUMBERS
II. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME ANO ADDRESS 12. REPORT OATE
Naval Electronic Systems Command (PME-
Washington, D.C. 20360 107)
September 197
6
13. NUMBER OF PACES
122
U. MONITORING AGENCY NAME ft AOORESSfJ/ dlllatant horn Controlling Otflca)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940




16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol thla Rapott)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol tho mmatrmct antarad In Slock 30, II dlllotont horn Raport)
IS. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES





20. ABSTRACT (Contlnuo on alda II nocoaamwy and idontitr by aloak mammot)
In 1972 the Chief of Naval Material perceived a prolif-
eration of small computer types in the Navy inventory. To
stem that proliferation a standard minicomputer was procured,
to be used in all current and future tactical systems requir-
ing a small digital processor. That standard was designated





aT7, 1473 EDITION OF I NOV SI IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0103- 014- 6601
I
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAOE (Whon Dmtm Kntorod)

Unclassified
fuCUWITY CLASSIFICATION OF This *> AGE.(W*wt n»»« Ent»r»d
support forced the Chief of Naval Material to tax the users
of the system to obtain the necessary development and opera-
tional support funds. Premature delivery of the system to
meet user schedules resulted in highly unreliable equipment
being used in development efforts. A significant adverse im-
pact on user project costs and schedules resulted. Examina-
tion of the standard minicomputer acquisition fosters a num-





1 Jan 73 Unclassified







In 1972 the Chief of Naval Material perceived a
proliferation of small computer types in the Navy
inventory. To stem that proliferation a standard
minicomputer was procured, to be used in all current
and future tactical systems requiring a small digital
processor. That standard was designated the
AN/OYK-20 (V) Data Processing System. Lack of
dedicated appropriated funds for procurement and
support forced the Chief of Naval Material to tax the
users of the system to obtain the necessary
development and operational support funds. Premature
delivery of the system to meet user schedules resulted
in highly unreliable equipment being used in
development efforts. A significant adverse impact on
user project costs and schedules resulted.
Examination of the standard minicomputer acquisition
fosters a number of recommendations for future
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In 1972 the Navy began procurement of a small digital
computer which was to be a standard minicomputer for
tactical system applications. That standard minicomputer
was later designated the AN/UYK-20(V) Data Processing
System.
The acquisition strategy employed and the resulting
events of the first three years of production caused great
concern among project managers who were required to use the
standard minicomputer.
At least one user project manager believed that an
objective look at the standard minicomputer acquisition was
necessary to prevent recurrence of those events which
adversely impacted on the development of tactical systems.
It is the objective of this thesis to examine the
standard minicomputer acquisition process, to evaluate the
system in light of user needs and 1972 state-of-the-art, to
identify those events which contributed to the adverse
impact of the standard minicomputer on development efforts,
and to offer some recommendations for future acquisitions of




In order to obtain information about minicomputers in
general and the AN/UYK-20 (V) Data Processing System in
particular, a literature search was conducted. Pertinent
references are listed at the end of the thesis.
To obtain a complete and objective picture of the
acquisition process it was then necessary to contact
personnel at all levels in user project organizations and
also personnel in the standard minicomputer project
organization. The following types of activities were
contacted to obtain information:
* Navy field activities - responsible for assembly,
checkout, delivery and maintenance of tactical
systems hardware and software.
* Navy laboratories - responsible for certain aspects
of tactical system development and testing.
* Private contractors - responsible for hardware and
software development of tactical systems under
contract to Navy project offices.
* Navy project offices - responsible for management of
the acquisition of tactical systems utilizing UYK-20
as a system component.
Additional information was obtained by attending two
AN/UYK-20 User's Group meetings. A minimal amount of
laboratory experience was gained on the OYK-20 itself.
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II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE NEED FOR A STANDARD MINICOMPUTER
The J\96Q , s saw the first successful employment of a
general purpose digital computer in a shipboard tactical
system. This event precipitated the introduction of a large
number of shipboard computers into the Navy inventory
manufactured by several different companies with slightly
different capabilities. Some of these computers are listed
















































This proliferation of tactical processors created the
following types of problems:
* Small and uneconomical procurement programs.
14

* Untenable material and logistics support posture.
* Increased scope of personnel training requirements.
* System interface and integration problems.
* Software incompatibility.
* Proliferation of support software.
Recognition of these problems prompted the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) to direct the Chief of Naval Material
(CNM) to develop a standard general purpose computer for
shipboard and shore applications. In August 1971, CNM
created the Tactical Digital Systems Office (TADSO)
(MAT-09Y) to carryout this directive. Figure 1 shows the
position of TADSO in the NAVMAT organization as of January
1975. The chart illustrates that the Director of TADSO was
in an influential postition, reporting directly to the Vice
Chief of Naval Material. MAT-09Y has traditionally been a
Rear Admiral.
CNM, by reference 1, described the scope of TADSO
efforts:
"(1) Inter-and intra- platform compatibility of all
tactical digital systems and equipment.
(2) Standardization of tactical digital equipment and
associated software.
(3) Configuration and interface management of tactical
digital equipment and software."
On 3 November 1971 TADSO published its first Tactical
Digital Standard (TADSTAND 1) [Ref. 2] which established the
AN/OYK-7 processor as the standard computer for shipboard
applications and the CMS-2 high-level language as the
standard high-level language to be employed in the
production of operational programs for tactical data
systems. TADSTAND 1 also provided that a request for
deviation from these standards could be initiated to TADSO
if it was thought to be in the best interests of the Navy to
15

use either another Navy computer or a computer not presently
in the Navy inventory.
In response to TADSIAND 1 some requests to deviate from
the OYK-7 standard were received. The most significant
justification given was that the OYK-7 was too large and
expensive ($720,000 average cost) for the intended
application. (See App. A for a description of the OYK-7
computer.) Out of this identified need for a smaller
computer grew the AN/OYK-20 (V) Data Processing System (DPS)
,
the Navy standard minicomputer.
It is the purpose of this chapter to establish the
meaning and implications of the terms "minicomputer" and
"standard", to identify the capabilities needed within the
Navy in a standard minicomputer system, and to establish
whether or not these capabilities could be met by a small
computer existing in the Navy inventory in 1972.
A. DEFINITION OF A MINICOMPUTER
Commercially available computers in 1972 formed almost a
continuous spectrum in size, power and capabilities.
Naturally, it is is difficult to separate the minicomputer
from larger or smaller types.
The possibility of a small computer with useful
capabilities and memory capacity grew with the development
of hybrid and integrated circuits in the mid-1960' s. In
1970 medium- and large-scale integration was introduced,
allowing even more capability to be designed into a small
package. At the same time these advancements were reducing
hardware costs at the rate of an order of magnitude per
decade. The advent of mini-peripherals specifically
designed for use with minicomputers was the final addition
to complete, low-cost mini-systems. At that time, as was




C. Weitzman [Ref. 11] defined the minicomputer as an 8-
to 18- bit word size machine with memory size from 1K to 32K
words. Costs range from $4,000 to $100,000. The
minicomputer is generally catagorized as having limited
accuracy, low speed for double-precision arithmetic
operations and no floating-point hardware. By 1972,
however, many minicomputers had multiple Input/Output (I/O)
access features and microprogrammable central processors
allowing extensive instruction repertoires with firmware
implementation of floating-point and special mathmatical
functions. A more detailed discussion of the minicomputer
technology of the early 1970's may be found in Chapter IV,
section B.
B. DEFINITION AND IMPLICATIONS OF A "STANDARD"
A "standard" could be defined as a specific entity which
will be used in every application where an entity of that
general description is required.
The contents of the several TADSTANDS published by TADSO
imply the following Navy policy concerning a "standard":
The entity identified as a "standard" will be used in
all developing and future tactical digital system
applications except where deviation is specifically
provided for, requested and approved.
References 3 through 9 are the standards promulgated by
TADSO as of May 1976. The impact of such standards in user
system design will be discussed in Chapt. IV. The
implications of establishing standards are summarized in the
following paragraphs.
Standardization allows realization of the economies of
large scale production. For example, as of May 1976, 824
AN/0YK-20 Data Processing Systems had been ordered and 637
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units delivered. At that time there were 107 programs using
the system. [Fig. 2 ] At the outset of the UYK-20 acquisition
the estimated production run was in excess of 4500 units.
This volume is over an order of magnitude greater than any
one program would require in an independent processor
acquisition. Clearly, the economies of scale would be
realized with such a program. Although it is impossible to
quantify the actual savings realized by using UYK-20 in any
particular project, the economies of scale are demonstrated
in the volume order prices for an AN/UYK-20 (V) DPS basic
configuration in fiscal year 1974:
Quantity - 50 at $25,966 each
Quantity - 100 at $24,735 each
Quantity - 150 at $24,324 each
It is also interesting to note that the Fiscal Year (FY)
1976 order price for a similar configuration is about
$25,000 each, approximately the same as the FY 74 price
despite inflation.
Standardization realizes cost savings in material
support. One project manager estimated that the cost of
introducing one new part into the Navy Supply System at SPCC
is about $1500. It has also been estimated that the Navy
realizes $20,000 to $40,000 per year in Integrated Logistic
Support (ILS) cost savings through a standardized system
like UYK-20.
Standardization avoids duplication of support software
costs. A project manager estimated a savings of $2,000,000
to $4,000,000 per year in software maintainance costs for a
project using a standard computer.
Standardization reduces the scope of required
maintenance training. The Chief of Naval Technical Training
emphasized this fact in a letter to the Director of TADSO,
pointing out that it was becoming increasingly difficult to
fill technical training billets, and that standardization
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programs like AN/UYK-7 help alleviate this problem .[ Ref. 10
]
It is estimated that about $409,000 per year savings in
technical training costs is realized through the existence
of OYK-20.
Standardization can reduce the amount of training
required for operator personnel. Lack of standardization
may mean that as an operator is transferred from one command
to another he must be sent back to school to learn new
equipment. Such an occurrence has a direct impact on fleet
readiness and personnel training costs. As an example, the
REWSON program faces this problem because some of its shore
installations utilize DSC PDP-11 computers while the
associated shipboard installations employ AN/U5TK-20 Data
Processing Systems.
Standardization saves the repetitive acquisition costs
of procurements of unique systems. These costs include the
recurring costs for ILS, software maintenance, etc. and also
the one-time development costs. As an example, the OYK-20
acquisition required $1.3 million in Research & Development
funding for militarization of commercial hardware, support
software, documentation, etc.
Despite these strong arguments in favor of
standardization, there is much resistance to any
standardization program. Mr. Howard Gantzler, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations 5 Logistics)
,
recognized that attitude when he stated at a seminar given
at the Naval Postgraduate School in January 1976,
"Everybody is in favor of it [standardization], but
nobody wants to adopt someone else's standards."
Rear Admiral E. B. Fowler, Vice Commander of the Naval
Electronics Systems Command identified another drawback of
standardization in an address to the Naval Postgraduate
School chapter of the IEEE in April 1976.
19

"You have to standardize. You can't afford not to do
so. But you must also get a firm grip on the half-life
of the thing you are standardizing... AN/UYK-20 was
thought at first to be a five year investment. We are
currently reprocurring, and it looks like ten to
fifteen years. The CP-642B's [CP-642B computer (ONIVAC
1212). See Chapt. II, sect. D. ] have been around for
sixteen to seventeen years, and we put them on the
Nimitz, the newest capital ship. This is a systems
engineering problem."
In that statement admiral Fowler suggests that once a
standard is established, it may be used for many more years
than anticipated unless a firm policy for replacement is
adopted at the outset. Understandably, the majority of
opposition to standardization was found by this author in
the technical community, which must design systems using
standardized components not specifically tailored to the
tasks required.
C. THE RANGE OF CAPABILITIES NEEDED
In January 1972, a Design Review Group (DRG) was
convened by TADSO to translate the requirements of the Navy
for a minicomputer system into a specification which could
be used as the basis for competitive bidding. It is
significant to note that the intent was not to fill the
entire range of size and power below the UYK-7, but only to
fill the identified current and future needs. Thus, from
the outset the success of UYK-20 depended on accurate
prediction of those needs by the DRG. The composition of
the DRG was most important, and it is interesting to note
the commands represented: Naval Ordnance Systems Command
(ORD-532) , Naval Ships Systems Command (SHIPS-0352'4) , Naval
Air Systems Command (&IR-5333F) , Naval Ships Engineering
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Center (SEC-6178D and SEC-6172), H. Q. Marine Corps (Code
AAM-4) , Fleet Combat Direction System Support Activities
Pacific and Atlantic, and Naval Weapons Laboratory Dahlgren.
The Naval Ordnance Systems Command and the Naval Ships
Systems Command have since been combined into one command
designated the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) . Thus all
the commands responsible for systems development were well
represented.
In order to save time and development costs, TADSO had
conceived an "off-the-shelf" procurement. That was an
important decision, which implied that the intent was to
procure a market-tested computer system which would only
need to be militarized.
Since the computer was to be general purpose and serve a
wide range of diverse applications, a modular building block
approach was conceived. A basic configuration was to be
specified and plug-in modules provided so that the user
could increase the size and power of the processor up to his
individual needs. Add-on modules were to be individually
priced so that the user only paid for the capability he
needed. The following paragraphs summarize the range of
capabilities which TADSO and the DRG foresaw would be needed
to meet Navy systems reguirements of 1972 and about five
years into the future.
1 . Packaging
The computer would be required to meet military
specification MIL-E-16400 for shipboard, groundbased, and
submarine electronic systems. This decision precluded
airborne applications of the computer, which would have
required the more stringent and expensive MIL-E-5400
specification, but would have expanded the applications and
thus the volume of production. The reason behind that
decision was the intention to produce an interim standard
shipboard computer to be eventually replaced by the
All-Applications Digital Computer (AADC) which was then
21

under development by the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) .
The AADC never materialized, and as of 1975 the AADC project
had been redirected to produce an Interim Standard Airborne
Digital Computer (ISADC) . Out of the ISADC project came the
AN/AYK-14 computer in 1976.
The computer was to be packaged in one enclosure of
maximum dimensions 26 inches high, 24 inches deep, and width
suitable for mounting in a standard 19-inch rack. Maximum
power consumption was to be one kilowatt.
To achieve the desired building block capability,
the following units were to be strictly plug-in with no
other hardware changes necessary to install: memory modules
of 8K-words per module, I/O channels in groups of two if
serial and in groups of four if parallel, real-time clock,
general registers, and microprogrammable control memory.
2« Reliabilit y and Maintainability
In accordance with MIL-E-16400, modular construction
was specified. All assemblies with a cost of $200 or less
would be throw-away components. Only those assemblies where
it was determined that repair would be more cost-effective
than throw-away/replacement would be designated as
repairable modules. It was further specified that repairs
would be performed by the contractor, a factor which had a
later impact on the repairable turn-around time.
The maximum configuration of the computer was to
have a Mean Time Between Failures (MT3F) of 2000 hours, a
Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) of 15 minutes and a Maximum Time
to Repair of 120 minutes. The MTBF specified was a figure
which had been used on previous military computer
specifications. As far as the author of this thesis could
determine, the basis for citing the 2000 hour figure was
historical rather than the result of calculation.
The computer was to be logically and electrically
designed to facilitate the isolation of malfunctioning
modules through diagnostic programming. The diagnostic
22

program was to isolate 95% of recurring (non-intermittent)
active logic element failures to not more than three printed
circuit card modules.
3 . Architectu re
The computer was to employ third generation
technology with the use of medium-scale integration.
Perhaps the most significant architectural
requirement was that the processor was to be
microprogram mable. The rationale for requiring this
capability was the possibility of a more powerful
macro-instruction set and the flexibility to modify or add
to the macro-instruction set by simply modifying the
contents of control memory. An additional requirement was
therefore for at least 500 words (16-bit) of user growth
capacity in the control memory.
Other required architecture attributes were: word
length at least 16-bits including sign but not including
parity, random access non-volatile memory with a separate
high speed memory desireable but not required, main memory
read-restore cycle time less than 1.2 microseconds,
asynchronous timing with at least one level of memory fetch
instruction overlap to create an effective memory cycle time
of less than one microsecond, minimum storage capacity of
8K-words expandable to at least 65K-words (directly
addressable) in 8K-word increments, a minimum of four
general registers expandable to sixteen.
It was significant that no requirement was made for
a capability to expand memory capacity beyond 65K-words.
Also significant was the absence of requirements for parity
checking, memory write protection or executive mode with
privileged instructions.
The question of parity checking was a much discussed
attribute. Those in favor cited the need to identify
hardware errors, particularly in memory accesses, when
attempting to debug software. In addition, arguments were
23

made in favor of identifying errors when executing
operational programs to prevent miscalculations of target
information, misrouting of data (particularly in message
handling systems) , mishandling of classified information/
etc. The arguments against parity pointed to the
significant cost in real estate (extra bits and about 10%
more logic) and extra memory bits per word. It was argued
that parity error detection had little value in modern
digital equipment since this attribute was designed to
detect single bit failures rather than catastrophic logic
failures affecting whole blocks of addresses; the latter
type of failure characterized the type of failure most often
encountered in modern equipment. Operationally it was
thought undesireable to interrupt processing of critical
target data to process parity errors in a combat situation.
In the end the cost considerations prevailed.
Although the question of memory protection was not discussed
to the same extent as memory parity checking, similar cost
and real estate savings could be realized by not including a
hardware memory protection feature in the design.
The macro-instruction set specified provided for
single and double word addition, subtraction,
multiplication, division, logical operations, shifts, jumps,
and a programmable stop. In a non-dual-state machine the
programmable stop would be non-privileged, making it a
controversial attribute. Only load, add, subtract and store
byte operations were specified, and no bit manipulation
instructions were required. It is significant that all
operations specified were arithmetic (recognizing the most
significant bit of a word as the sign) so that no capability
for full 16-bit data manipulation was required. Instruction
execution times were specified as follows:
Instruction Register -to- Register Memory-to- Register
Add, Subtract 1.2 microseconds 2.2 microseconds
Load, Store N/A 2.2 microseconds
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Multiply 9 microseconds 11 microseconds
Divide 20 microseconds 22 microseconds
Shift (16-bit) 7 microseconds N/A
The computer was to be capable of executing not less than
500,000 instructions per second for the following
distribution of memory-to-register instructions:
Instruction Tyjae Percen t of Mix
Add, or equivalent 34







The choice between one* s-complemsnt or
two's-complement arithmetic was left to the contractor,
despite the fact that most previous Navy computers were
one's-complement machines. That decision would impact on
future software compatibility and system integration.
The DRG specified at least single-level indirect
addressing, indexing, and relative addressing to a fixed
base which could be program modified.
A hardware (or firmware) capability to load programs
(bootstrap) was to be provided. The intent was that the
bootstrap would be a plug-in option wherein the user could
obtain bootstrap capability for the particular peripheral
and channel desired.
** • Input/Output
It was intended that the I/O structure be such that
the I/O channels access memory through a second memory port,
eliminating interference with processor operations. This
requirement meant that an arithmetic unit, data registers,
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etc. were required for each channel to perform buffer
control functions, address calculations, interrupt control,
etc. In order to save on real estate, the channels (a total
of sixteen) were to be grouped in increments of not more
than four channels for parallel mode, or two channels for
serial mode. Only one aider and set of data registers plus
control circuitry would be required per four channel group.
This requirement, while saving circuitry and cost placed
several significant restrictions on possible I/O
configurations:
* For parallel mode data transfer, each four channel
group was constrained to one type of interface.
* Serial and parallel channels could not be mixed
within a group.
* Double word (32-bit) transfers, such as necessary for
interfacing with UYK-7, would require one channel
from each of two adjacent groups, thus forcing eight
channels to be of the same type of interface. (This
requirement stems from the need for separate
processing circuitry for the upper and lower 16-bits
of 32-bit parallel transfers.)
Direct Memory Access (DMA) was desired but not
required. Thus, a provision for direct memory access by a
high speed mass storage device (such as a disk) could
somewhat compensate for the lack of provision for expansion
of main memory beyond 65K-words.
Various types of interfaces were to be provided as
options:
* Parallel (MIL-STD-1397)
NTDS Past (-3 volts)





RS-232C synchronous and asynchronous normal
speeds
MIL-STD-188C synchronous and asynchronous normal
speeds
MIL-STD-1397 (NTDS) 32-bit serial
MIL-STD-188C high speed (up to one million bits
per second)
All parallel types were to provide full duplex
operation in a normal data transfer (16- or 32-bit) mode, an
intercomputer mode, or an externally specified address (ESA)
mode. Asynchronous serial channels were to provide
full-duplex operation at bit rates of 75, 150, 300, 600, and
1200 bits per second (baud) with 2400, 4800 and 9600 baud
desireable.
5. Interrupts
A priority structure of interrupts was specified
with the following types of interrupts required (in order of
priority, highest to lowest) : power failure protection,
instruction fault, real-time clock overflow, internal clock
interrupt, intercomputer time-out, external device interrupt
and I/O interrupts.
Despite the usefulness of nesting interrupts, the
specification required only that interrupts occuring
simultaneously be nested. Furthermore, the specification
required that all interrupts of lower priority be disabled
while processing an interrupt.
6. Cont rol/Ma in tenaace Panel
The specification required that a
control/maintenance panel be provided that could be, but was
not required to be separate from the computer. Noraal panel
displays, indicators and controls were to be provided (these
were specified in detail) . Significantly, the panel could
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be configured to display only one register at a time, or
more, as the manufacturer wished.
7 . Soft ware
It is significant that the question of software was
not addressed in the specification generated by the DRG. In
the Request-for-Proposals (RFP) only an assembler was
required.
Appendix B summarizes the specifications for the
standard minicomputer system as determined by TADSO and the
DRG.
D. CAPABILITIES OF EXISTING NAVY COMPUTERS TO MEET THE
SPECIFICATIONS
It is valid to investigate whether the perceived present
and future needs of the Navy for a minicomputer, as defined
by the DRG, could be met by an existing general purpose
small computer in the Wavy inventory. If so, this computer
could be designated a standard just as the AN/UYK-7 had been
a year before.
The sections below discuss the pertinent features of
some of those Navy computers which would have been most
likely to fill the need for a standard minicomputer.
Appendices C through F summarize the characteristics of
those computers.
Comparing the standard minicomputer specification with
the existing computers reveals that none met the
specification completely, although two were good candidates
with certain exceptions. The AN/UYK-15(V) lacked
microprogramming and relative addressing, but was otherwise
acceptable. It had additional features such as memory parity
checking, memory write protection and multi-ported memory
banks to further recommend it. The AN/UYK- 1 2 (V) also lacked
microprogramming and did not meet all required instruction
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execution speeds or memory capacity, but had an extensive
support software package to recommend it.
The existence of UYK-12 and UYK-15 brings the decision
to specify a microprogrammed processor under close scrutiny.
As discussed in the previous section, the advantages of
microprogrammability are an expanded macro-instruction set,
ability to implement high speed floating-point, mathematical
and trigonometric functions as needed, and flexibility to
add high-speed user macros to facilitate real-time
processing. The disadvantages were best summarized in
enclosure (1) of a letter to TADSO from the Naval Air
Systems Command (AIR-5333)
,
"The latter deficiency [the requirement for
micro-programmability ], while being technically
feasible, leads to unusual hardware and software
configuration management problems. NAVAIR believes
that a requirement for micro-programmability has not
been demonstrated and will serve only to eliminate
qualified vendors. "[ Ref. 13]
NAVAIR* s comments about configuration management refer
to the potential user capability to modify the
macro-instruction set. It must be pointed out that
configuration control can be maintained by requiring that
all modifications to the macro-instruction set be upward
compatible with the basic set.
The foregoing comments not-withstanding,
microprogrammability remained a requirement, and none of the
existing Navy computers could meet the specification. It is
also interesting to note that a majority of the computers in
the Navy inventory were manufactured by the UNIVAC Defense
Systems Division of Sperry Rand Corporation (UNIVAC) . The
Rolm Corporation manufactured AN/UYK- 12 (V) is an exception,
and there were others. Comparison of the standard
minicomputer specification with the UNIVAC manufactured
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computers reveals that the DRG was probably influenced by
the ONIVAC design philosophy in producing their
specification. For instance, the UYK-12 I/O structure,
which was not in accordance with the specification, was
simply another method of accomplishing the same end. It is
the opinion of this author that the use in the RFP of the
detailed technical specification produced by the DRG rather
than a performance specification, probably excluded some
candidate minicomputers from the competition.
1- CP-642B
This computer, a militarized version of the ONIVAC
1212, was an upward compatible follow-on to the
USQ-20/CP-642/CP-6 42A family. Designed specifically for use
in the Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS) , its architecture
optimized processing of large quantities of complex data
where heavy I/O comunication was required. With reference
to App. C it can be seen that although CP-642B was a
minicomputer in capabilities, it was a physically larger
unit than desired. Its size and slow speed are a result of
its second generation architecture. Lack of serial I/O
capability, lack of interrupts and limited memory were other
factors which made this computer unacceptable. Appendix C
profiles the CP-64 2B.
2 . AN/DYK-15 ( V)
The shortcomings of this computer, a militarized
UNIVAC 1616, have been previously discussed. Additional
desireable features incorporated in the AN/UYK-15(V) include
optional additional general registers up to 64, memory
parity checking and a priority structured, multi-ported
memory. This latter feature incorporates a priority
multiplexer which provides four access ports for each
16K-word memory bank. Combined with separate IOC's for each
group of four I/O channels, this feature allows simultaneous
access to different memory banks by the CPU and various
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Commercially designated the UNIVAC 1289, this
computer was designed for navigation system applications.
Although of second generation technology, it featured
reasonable speed. It failed in a number of ways to meet the
standard minicomputer specification, but it had some




protection, memory parity checking, and floating-point
hardware. Appendix E profiles the CP-890.
a . AN/aYK-12 m
That computer was designed from the ground up as a
militarized Data General NOVA with a military application
I/O structure added. Designated the Rolm 1601, it was
completely upward compatible with the NOVA and could thus
run all software developed for that popular minicomputer.
The I/O structure was basically a singla I/O bus
with the facility to address 61 different devices. Each
device could independently interrupt the processor according
to a predetermined priority. The computer could be
configured with up to 16 I/O interfaces and 15 backpanel
connectors.
An extensive package of well-tested and
well-documented support software was available. Included
were cross-assemblers and cross-compilers so that programs
for the UYK-15 could be assembled or compiled on a larger
machine. That feature recognized the constraints on using a
minicomputer for program development.
In this chapter the meaning and implications of a
standard minicomputer have been established. The Navy
requirements for a minicomputer system in 1972 were
discussed, and it was concluded that no existing small
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computer in the Navy inventory could meet those
requirements. In Chapt. Ill the history of the standard
minicomputer acquisition project will be discussed.
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III. DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION HISTORY
The events leading to the publication of a specification
for a standard minicomputer have been detailed in the
previous chapter. This chapter will relate the history of
the AN/UYK-20(V) acquisition from specification to mid-year
1976. Much of the information on events leading to the
contract award in May 1973 was derived from a research paper
by Captain J. S. Sansone [Ref. 14], who was the Project and
Contracting officer for the standard minicomputer
procurement.
In June 1972 the preliminary specification for the
standard minicomputer was distributed for final review. By
that time TADSO was well established and had issued six
TADSTANDS on a variety of subjects. [Refs. 2-8] The
acquisition strategy called for militarization of a
commercial system requiring a minimum of system development
to meet the DRG specification. It was estimated that about
$1.8 million in Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
Navy (RDT&EN) appropriated funds would be necessary to cover
costs of design and devalopment, militarization, Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE) , environmental and reliability
testing, TEMPEST testing, Integrated Logistics Support
plans, development of technical manuals, other data
requirements, and support software development.
In late August 1972 CNM advised CNO«s Director of
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (OP-098) of the
existance of the standard minicomputer specification, and
the need for prompt approval to preclude further
proliferation of commercial minicomputers in the Navy
inventory. OP-098 was also informed that the necessary $1.8
million in RDT&EN funds could be obtained by reprogramming
Fiscal Year 1973 funds from sub-allocations to the various
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projects who would use the standard minicomputer. Since the
amount of funds to be reprogrammed did not exceed $2
million, prior approval from the Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF) and the Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees of Congress was not required. Reprogramming
could be carried out within the Department of the Navy with
the approval of the budget activity sponsor (OP-098) . There
was sufficient justification for this plan since the user*s
funds would have been used for a computer procurement
anyway. However, the plan raised potential user project
manager objections. First, control over the design and
development of the minicomputer would be taken out of the
hands of the project managers and vested in an independent
office. Second, great risks were involved in the delivery
schedule. Third, ELEX-560 could not have the specific needs
of all the user projects at heart when making tradeoff
decisions regarding cost, schedule and performance.
By mid-September 1972 the approval of CNO was assured.
CNM tasked the Commander, Naval Electronic Systems Command
(CCMNAVELEX) to handle the procurement. In response,
C0MNA7ELEX created a division within his Material
Acquisition Directorate (ELEX-05) to carry out this task.
The division was designated the Standard Tactical Digital
Equipment Division (ELEX-560). [Fig. 3] At this time the
procurement plan specified a formally advertised two-step
procurement based on the DRG specification and resulting in
a firm-fixed-price contract.
In October 1972, in response to TADSTAND 1, TADSO
received a request from the Mk68 Gunfire Control System
(GFCS) project to deviate from the OYK-7 standard in favor
of a commercial minicomputer. The request was subsequently
denied, and the requirements of the Mk68 GFCS project became
the first firm requirements for standard minicomputer
systems. The constraints of the Mk68 GFCS project schedule
were thus imposed on the standard minicomputer procurement.
The new schedule constraints forced abandonment of the
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formal two-step procurement in favor of an accelerated plan.
The plan called for a negotiated procurement under
paragraphs 2304 (a) (2) and (10) of Title 10 of the United
States Code. Those regulations allowed a negotiated
procurement in lieu of a formally-advertised, sealed-bid
competition in cases where the exigency would not permit the
delay incident to formal advertising and when it was
impractical to obtain competition. Significant milestones
adopted were:
* Issuance of the Request for Proposals (RFP) by 1
December 1972
* Award of the contract by 22 February 1973
* Delivery of the first Functional Demonstration Models
(FDM - non-militarized prototype) 30 days after award
of contract
* Commencement of testing by 22 September 1973
* Delivery of the first Advanced Production Engineering
Models (APE - militarized prototype) nine months
after award of contract
* Delivery of the first production units by May 1974
Technical evaluation (TECHEVAL) would be completed in the
contractors plant and operational evaluation (OPEVAL) would
be completed concurrently with the OPEVAL of the first user
system. A firm-fixed-price contract was anticipated. The
accelerated plan precluded detailed analysis of proposals to
determine which contractor offered the best performance per
price. It was planned to simply select the lowest bidder
among those found responsive to the DRG specification.
Thus, little improvement on the DRG design was possible
through the acquisition process.
On 15 November 1972, CNM declared the DRG specification
as the Navy standard minicomputer specification and
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constrained all projects planning or procuring minicomputers
to use the standard as Government Furnished Equipment unless
approval was obtained from TADSO to deviate. [Ref. 15] Three
projects in addition to MJc68 GFCS were specifically directed
to switch to the standard minicomputer for their production
phase: the SPS-48 Radar Improvement Program, which had gone
through development with the AN/UYK-15 (V) computer; the
Carrier Tactical Support Center project (CVTSC) , which had
gone through development with the IBM SP-1 computer, and the
Satellite Communications program (SATCOM) , which had gone
through development with the Rolm Corporation 1602 computer.
This directive was probably premature since all projects
were then forced to include in their production plans a
component that was only a piece of paper with no proposals
in hand to guarantee the feasibility of meeting the proposed
schedule milestones.
The establishment of the specification as a standard
resulted in identification of more projects requiring a
minicomputer. As of mid-November 1972 estimated
requirements for some 314 production units (through Fiscal
Year 1974) had been identified. Since this figure was
expected to change, and delivery dates were not known,
ELEX-560 proposed an Indefinite Delivery, Requirements type
contract. Competition would be based on unit price per lot
quantity for a specified system configuration plus prices of
certain add-on modules. By mid-November 1972, 25 firms had
indicated a desire to submit proposals and none were thought
to be unresponsive. A fully competitive procurement seemed
assured.
The RFP released on 1 December 1972 cited the milestones
previously listed and a three year production run. Each
year's production was an option to be priced separately so
that the contractor could protect himself from inflation.
The RFP contained estimated production requirements for each
year to protect the contractor from the high risks of
bidding on unknown production quantities. Production funds
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would be obtained directly from the users at the time they
placed orders under the annual Requirements Contracts. The
RFP also specified a government option for rights to the
technical data to provide for a competitive follow-on
procurement.
At this point some comments should be made about the
acquisition strategy. First, a great deal of the success
hinged on obtaining adequate competition. Without it, there
would be little to choose from as far as system design and
price. Second, the desire to select the lowest bidder
precluded opting for a better design at a slightly higher
acquisition cost, thus achieving better performance and
reliability and possibly a lower overall life-cycle cost.
Third, unless later funding for the standard minicomputer
project was forthcoming from Operations & Maintenance Navy
(O&MN) appropriated funds, the users would bear the costs of
support software maintenance and enhancements, system
improvements, maintenance of documentation and other support
costs. This was a point that worried user project managers.
Put simply, if the orders stopped the funding would stop,
and the system would no longer be supported.
By the end of December 1972 the estimated award date had
slipped to 1 March 1973 because of changes to the RFP.
Those changes resulted from substitution of the CVTSC
project requirements for the Mk68 GFCS requirements when the
latter projects funds were cut. At that time there were
also growing complaints from interested companies that the
RFP closing date was too soon, the specification was too
restrictive, and the delivery date for FDM's was
unrealistic. Because of these points, plus the unspoken
consensus that the specification favored one company^
design philosophy, about 19 of the original 25 interested
firms declined to submit proposals. Included in these 19
were IBM Corporation, Rolm Corporation, Control Data
Corporation (CDC) , and Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC)
.
The competition was rapidly vanishing.
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The options open to the Navy at this point were as
follows:
* Maintain the schedule despite the high probability of
a sole-source procurement.
•
* Slip user project schedules in order to extend the
proposal due date and gain more competition.
* Cancel the RFP and restructure the procurement as a
development effort.
The decision was to slip the closing date for receipt of
proposals to 2 April 1973 and extend the date for delivery
of FDM*s to 120 days after date of contract. Since this
schedule might not meet some potential user schedules, a
risk of losing some firm requirements had been accepted.
During the month of February 1973 two formal protests on
the RFP were filed with the Government Accounting Office
(GAO) . The first, from Control Data Corporation, was
satisfied by the extension of the due date for proposals.
The second, from UNIV&C, objected to the extension on the
grounds that the company had spent considerable effort and
funds to meet the original dates. An important point
brought out in this latter protest was that no firm had a
computer that would meet the specification completely, and
that substantial design and development effort were
necessary in all cases. SAO subsequently determined that no
violation of procurement law had occurred, and UNIVAC's
protest was denied.
Although not required for a procurement of such low
estimated dollar value ($1.8 million), a Source Selection
Authority (SSA) , Source Selection Advisory Council (SSAC)
,
and Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) were
designated. The SSEB consisted of the DRG plus
representatives of NAVELEX, the Marine Corps and TADSO. The
SSAC consisted of representatives of NAVELEX and TADSO with
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expertise in management systems, cost analysis, logistic
support, etc. The SSA was COMNAVELEX with the advice and
consent of CNM.
On 2 April 1973 proposals were received from UNI7AC,
CDC, General Electric and Raytheon. The SSEB proceeded to
evaluate the proposals without knowledge of prices and found
all firms to be responsive to the DRG specification. The
SSAC determined that adeguate price competition existed. A
pre-award survey was conducted at each plant during the week
of 16 to 20 April 1973. All offerers were found to be
technically and financially responsible and responsive in
accordance with Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR)
1-903. Contract award was made to the low bidder, UNIVAC,
on 27 April 1973. The contract included all hardware
reguirements plus an assembler for a f irm-fixad-price of
$673,000.
Soon after contract award, user reguirements for
additional support software in addition to the assembler
were identified. To meet this need, sole-source contracts
were let to ONIVAC for two self-hosted systems. The first,
designated Level I, was released in November 1973. The
second, designated Level II, was released in January
1974. [App. G] NAVELEX also contracted with UNIVAC at that
time to develop two other support software packages: a
standard real-time executive later designated SDEX-20, which
was to provide users with basic software modules upon which
to build their operational programs; and a compiler for the
Navy standard high-level language (CMS-2) , which would
generate machine code for the UYK-20. This high-level
language for the UYK-20 was designated CMS-2M and was to be
a subset of the CMS-2 language. These additional contracts
were funded from the balance remaining of $1.3 million in
RDT&EN funds reprogrammed for the UYK-20 acguisition.
In May 1973 TADSO revised TADSTAND 1 to designate the
UYK-20 as the Navy Standard digital processor for those
applications requiring a minicomputer. [Ref. 3 ] As expected,
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this action generated a few requests for deviation from that
standard. Most were turned down. The Submarine Integrated
Radio Room (IRR) project, which was developing with the CDC
MPP computer and the AN/UYK-15 (V) , had a request to deviate
denied on the basis that the OYK-20 was upward compatible
with the OYK-15. Very few requests for deviation were
granted. The VERDIN retrofit project was granted a waiver
due to size problems in retrofitting equipment into a
submarine, and the necessity for compatibility with existing
equipments. The SEA SCOOT project was granted a waiver
since two systems were already deployed with the
AN/OYK-12 (V) , urgent requirements existed for four more
systems, and no more than a total of six systems were to be
acquired. The BOLLSEYE project was granted a waiver to use
the DEC PDP-11 computer as its shore-site cryptologic
processor. Justification for that waiver was that the
PDP--11 was currently in use at shore sites, associated
engineers and support systems were available, and shipboard
use was not anticipated.
On 27 March 1974 the OYK-20 received service approval.
A major milestone in any program, this event also had a
profound impact on the funding of the project. Once service
approval was received, the activities of ELEX-560 could no
longer be supported with RDT&EN funds. Since no Operations
& Maintenance Navy (O&MN) funds were available to support
the project, NAVELEX was forced to assess users of the
system for system support in the following manner. The
DYK-20 contract was a Requirements, Indefinite Delivery
contract which allowed the users to purchase systems and
components by transmitting a DD Form 1155 (Order for
Supplies or Services) to ELEX-560 with an order form
attached. The user's funds were obligated via tha DD Form
1155, and the order form provided a detailed description of
the equipment and software requested. The user obligated
funds according to a published price list. These published
prices included a surcharge over the fixed prices in the
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contract; it was this surcharge which was used to fund
ELEX-560 support activities.
Occasionally users would require new system components
(e.g. bootstraps, I/O interfaces, and/or peripheral handler
software routines for a unique peripheral device) .
Naturally the requesting user had to provide funds for the
development of his unique requirement. This was
accomplished by submitting a DD Form 1149 (Requisition and
Invoice/Shipping Document) to ELEX-560 with a description of
the needed material. ELEX-560 would use the authority
transmitted by the DD Form 1149 to obligate the user's funds
on a sole-source Time and Materials type contract with
ONIVAC for the development effort.
Accounting for the surcharge and the myriad of
appropriation budget activities cited by the users was an
elaborate task. Frequent liason with ordering activities
was necessary to insure that surcharges were "paid" out of
appropriation catagories which could be properly used by
ELEX-560. For the most part O&MN funds were required to
fund project tasks.
The surcharge systam concerned user project managers.
Primary objections were (1) the necessity to pay prices
above the fixed prices on the contract, and (2) the
realization that if no orders were received the funding
support for the project would dry up. Each year NAVZLEX
requested sufficient O&MN funding to support the project,
but those funds were never forthcoming. Project personnel
believed that the project requirements were cut from the
Navy budget submission by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) or the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
.
In September 1974 the first issue of "The Standard" was
published. This document was, as stated in its header, "a
bi-monthly newsletter published to inform AN/UYK-20 users of
current status and new developments that involve the
AN/UYK-20 (V) computer and its support software." "The
Standard" was a step toward solving the communications
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>roblem that plagues all bureaucratic organizations.
About that same time the idea of a formal user's
>rganization was conceived, and in November 1974 the first
kN/UYK-20 User's Group meeting was held at the Naval
Slectronics Laboratory Center (NELC) in San Diego. The
neeting attracted some 200 persons from government and
private industry. By mid-1976 the AN/UYK-20 User's Group
*as meeting semi-annually in the Spring and Fall and boasted
i membership of close to 300 persons. Each meeting provided
a forum for ELEX-560 to transmit further information to the
jsers, but more importantly for the users to present ideas
in briefings and presentations which would benefit other
users. The meetings also provided an opportunity for users
and project cffice personnel to meet face to face and
liscuss problems.
At the November 1976 (Jser's Group meeting at the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, the Fleet Combat Direction
Systems Support Activity (FCDSSA) San Diego announced the
release of a compiler for the UYK-20 computer. This
compiler, designated CMS-2Y(20), operated under the SHARE/7
operating system on the AN/UYK-7 computer. The compiler was
designed to provide versatile program development
capability, since it utilized the powerful programming aids
available under SHARE/7. [App. G]
By late-1974 the first UYK-20 computers had been
received and were in use in the development of tactical
systems. Many hardware failures were encountered in these
early computers. The hardware problems were compounded by
the fact that the diagnostic program package for the UYK-20
was not available to users until November 1974. Users were
dependent on UNIVAC field engineers to perform corrective
maintenance. Errors were also encountered in the support
software and in the documentation for both hardware and
software. In general these problems were discovered and
solved through trial and error, but with large expenditures
of user time and funds.
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The types of problems most often encountered during the
early period in late-1974 were: Memory Array Board failures,
Memory Control Board failures, broken or bent connection
pins on printed circuit (PC) cards, defective power
supplies, PC cards not seated properly, and software
documentation which either contained erroneous descriptions
of software capabilities or neglected to mention
capabilities that existed. The contractor, who was
responsible for correcting many of the problems, submitted
Engineering Change Proposals (ECP's) to NAVELEX to correct
deficiencies. Because of a clause in the contract which
required all production units to be identical, a retrofit
was necessary to incorporate the approved Engineering
Changes into production units already in the field. UYK-20
serial number 350, which came off the production line in
December 1975, became the baseline unit for the first
retrofit. All 349 previous production units were affected
in varying degrees. Retrofit I consisted of minor changes
such as replacement of screws, mountings, and fittings, and
major changes such as replacement of power supplies in
serial numbers 1 through 12, replacement of PC cards which
had been redesigned, and modifications to existing cards.
The retrofit was performed in the field by UNIVAC engineers
during the period from January 1975 to September 1976.
Despite the discovery and correction of many
deficiencies, by mid-1975 the frequency of failures in
production units signified that a reliability problem did
exist. Perhaps the best data base attesting to the
suspected reliability problems came from the Naval
Electronics Systems Engineering Center (NESEC) at San Diego.
This activity was tasked with assembly and checkout of the
Navy Message Address Communications System (NAVMACS) , which
was one of the first systems using UYK-20 to reach the
fleet. During the period late-1974 to mid-1975, NESEC San
Diego reported that a high percentage of production units
were received inoperative due to faulty PC cards and
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assembly modules. Spares received were also defective,
making trouble-shooting with the diagnostic programs very
difficult. (Trouble-shooting procedures utilizing the
diagnostic routines depended on substituting spare modules
and PC cards for suspected defective parts.) Some failures
were intermittant , making them extremely difficult to
diagnose.
Records at NESEC San Diego indicate that during the
period late-1974 to mid-1975 many modules were experiencing
60% to 70% failure rates. Particular problem areas were
power supplies, Memory Array Boards, seating of I/O cards,
and overheating in hot weather. It was found that over a
significant period of operation, however, the failure rate
would be substantially decreased, indicating that a
"burn-in" period increased reliability.
In response to the reports from NESEC San Diego,
personnel from UNIVAC visited that activity and verified the
need to upgrade reliability. In June and July of 1975
UNIVAC voluntarily shut down the production line in
Clearwater, Florida to investigate the possibility of severe
Quality Assurance (QA) problems. Over the ensuing months
the contractor took the following action to up-grade UYK-20
quality:
* Personnel Improvements
Established QA as an independent organization.
Transferred added QA technical and management
capability from the main plant in St. Paul,
Minnisota to the UYK-20 production plant in
Clearwater.
Hired additional quality engineers and
inspectors.
Added a program QA man in Clearwater.
Transferred final testing to Manufacturing in




* Documentation and Procedures
Reviewed and updated all inspection and test
procedures.
• Established formal procedures for resolving
Defense Contract Administration Service (DCAS)
and ONIVAC quality concerns and for implementing
corrective actions.
Reviewed and improved assembly processes.
Added automatic equipment.
Introduced new material handling containers for
PC cards.
Developed new fixtures for holding memory arrays
during assembly.
* Training and Motivation
Hired a full-time trainer.
Established a dedicated training room.
Instituted training programs for manufacturing
and inspection personnel.
Established certification criteria and
recertification time periods for all key skills.
* Management Reviews
Increased local audits.
Established formal defect trend reviews with
manufacturing and QA.
Implemented corrective action follow-up on key
defects.
strengthened and increased management audits.
After the June to July shutdown and the subsequent
quality improvement program, UNIVAC experienced a 66%
improvement in acceptance tests at the Clearwater plant.
These improvements were felt by the users in late- 1975 when
a high percentage of computers received from the factory
were in operational condition.
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In late-1974, in response to user demands, Onivac
developed a User's Handbook for the AN/OTK-20 (V) DPS. This
handbook was written primarily for operational program
development programmers and contained a description of the
hardware and detailed descriptions of support software. The
handbook was first released in early-1975 and by mid-1976
had undergone four major revisions to correct numerous
errors and incorporate new software systems.
Early in 1975 SDEX-20 (the Standard Real-Time Executive)
and the CMS-2M compiler were released. Since CMS-2M was a
subset of the CMS-2 standard high-level language, it became
a standard also. OYK-20 users were required to write their
operational programs in that language. A few projects had
begun development using other languages, pradominantly
FORTRAN, and were unwilling to rewrite. Their objections
cited schedule impact, increased development cost and the
high risk associated with using an untested compiler. TADSO
held a firm line, and most projects still in development
were forced to switch to CMS-2M.
Op to the beginning of 1975 no peripheral devices
existed which were specifically meant for use in Navy
tactical systems. It was rapidly becoming apparent that
proliferation of diverse peripheral equipments was also a
problem. By May 1975, 76 unique peripheral devices were in
use with the OYK-20 computer. In February and March of 1975
two contracts were let for peripheral devices which were
destined to become standards for use in Navy systems:
* A contract with QOANTEX, Peripherals Division of
North Atlantic Industries Incorporated for a
Cartridge Magnetic Tape Onit (CMTO) which was
eventually designated AN/OSH-26 (V)
.
* A contract with ONIVAC for an Alphanumeric Display





The acquisition strategy for these peripheral units was
identical to that utilized in the standard minicomputer
procurement. Requirements, Indefinite Delivery,
firm-fixed-price contracts were awarded to the low bidders
among those contractors found responsible and responsive to
the RFP. The first standard peripheral production units
were scheduled to be delivered in October 1976.
As a result of its diversification into peripheral
equipments and other areas, at the beginning of Fiscal Year
1976 ELEX-560 was redesignated the Automatic Data Processing
(ADP) Systems Division (ELEX-570) . With the redesignation
came increased scope of responsibilities including:
* Tactical ADP hardware development.
* Tactical ADP software development.
* Tactical ADP display systems development.
*
In September and October of 1975 the Disk File Manager
software and Machine Independent System Generator software
packages were released. [App. G]
In November 1975, at the AN/UYK-20 User's Group meeting,
it was announced that a User's Group Software Directory
would be published quarterly by the Publications Chairman of
the User's Group. This directory was designed to inform
users of the availability of operational and support
software developed by other users. Although the concept was
good, by May 1976 there were no suppliers of information on
their software, although there were many requests for the
directory.
Also announced at the November 1975 meeting was an
AN/UYK-20 Test, Analyse and Fix (TAAF) program. This
program, to be carried out at the Naval Weapons Center at
Dahlgren, was designed to accomplish the following
objectives:




Ensure recently retrofitted field changes
improved OYK-20 operation.
Detect any additional changes required to
demonstrate a 2000 hour MTBF.
* Establish a OIK-23 field data collection program.
The test setup was to cousist of four machines variously
configured to excercise all hardware options. A total of
12,000 hours of operation under steady-state temperature,
voltage and frequency conditions was planned. Two of the
machines were to be subjected to a total of 600 hours of
vibration testing. In May 1976 the results of the TAAF
program were reported to the Oser's Group assembled at the
Naval Underwater Systems Center in New London.:
* Corrective Action Items Identified
Memory Array Board fabrication popped resistors
and cracked cores.
• The master clock was overloaded.
Miscellaneous logic gates were overloaded.
A certain type of Read-Only-Memory (ROM) was
defective and should be replaced.
* Corrective Action items Installed
An Engineering Change to eliminate clock
overload.
a Increased QA inspection of Memory Array Boards
and Power Supplies.
* Observations
No component reliability problems were detected.
Reliability agreed closely with available field
data.
Failures were due to fabrication techniques,
design problems and norma l component failure.
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The data gathered during the TAAF program showed that MTBF
during the first 4000 hours of operation on the four
machines remained low at about 500 to 600 hours. After 4000
hours a steady improvement occurred so at the completion of
testing (12,000 hours) the MTBF was about 1500 hours. The
results of these formal tests essentially confirmed what had
been suspected by users a year and a half previously - that
memory boards and power supplies were a major cause of
failures, and that a significant "burn-in" period was
necessary for reliable operation.
By the end of 1975 many design deficiencies had been
corrected through Engineering Changes. The contractor had
also requested waivers on certain deficiencies which he
thought too rare to warrant attention. ELEX-570 approved
two of those requests for deviation from the design
specifications: circuit breaker trip under shock test, and
Electromagnetic Interference (specifically magnetic
radiation) test results. All other requests had been
refused, but by the end of 1975 the contractor had failed to
correct three deficiencies:
* The NTDS serial I/O interface was experiencing signal
reflections when cable lengths of 150 to 225 feet
were used.
* Dnder certain conditions the condition code was not
set properly during double precision subtract
operations.
* Onder certain conditions Floating Point Add/Subtract
operations resulted in errors.
As a result, the government stopped accepting production
units from December 1975 to February 1976. This firm action
caused the contractor to submit ECP's to correct the three
deficiencies.
Computer serial number 550, which was produced in
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February 1976, became the base-line for a second retrofit.
Retrofit II implemented the Engineering Changes to correct
the three design deficiencies listed above plus six others.
(About 90 Engineering Change Proposals had been submitted by
that time.)
Naturally, the two shutdowns put UYK-20 production
behind schedule. At the User's Group meeting in May, 1976
it was reported that 824 units had been ordered, but only
637 delivered.
At the same User's Group meeting ELEX-570 reported the
establishment of an AN/UYK-20 Support Software Repository.
The purpose of the repository was to collect and distribute
as required to U. S. Government UYK-20 users, software
developed by other U. S. Government users. This effort was
designed to reduce software development redundancy and thus
reduce development costs. Also reported to the User's Group
was the impending release of a new technical manual, the
first major revision of this document.
This chapter has related the growing pains of a computer
system from development through initial production. Many of
the problems were to be expected in such a project. The
unfortunate part of the UYK-20 history was that throughout
this growth period users were dependent on the computer as a
component in tactical systems under development. The early
unreliability of this component compounded the problems
encountered in developing those systems. The next chapter
will discuss the impact of the UYK-20 computer on user
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IV. EVALUATION OF THE SYSTEM
The previous chapters have been historical in nature,
relating the events which marked the development and initial
production run of the standard minicomputer. It is the
purpose of this chapter to evaluate the system itself and
the impact of UYK-20' s growing pains on the development of
those systems which used it as a system component.
A. COMPARISON OF SPECIFICATION AND FINAL PRODUCT
Chapter II, Section C and Appendix B discussed the
specification upon which the AN/UYK-20 DPS acquisition was
based. To complete the historical picture presented in
previous chapters, it is necessary to briefly discuss the
actual product which resulted from the standard minicomputer
acquisition. For ease of comparison, App. H summarizes the
characteristics of UYK-20 as it existed at mid-year 1976.
Appendix B summarizes the DRG*s specification. Appendix I
lists the basic hardware configuration and options
available. Appendix G describes the system support
software. References 16 and 17 provide further dstails.
By comparing Apps. B and H it can be seen that the
UYK-20 system met or exceeded the specification in all major
areas except reliability and maintainability. As discussed
in the previous chapter, MTBF to 2000 hours has never been
demonstrated. No empirical data on MTTR was available. It
must be remembered that MTTR included localization of the
problem, correction, alignment and calibration, and system
checkout. It could be pastulated that meeting an MTTR of 15
minutes presumed that the diagnostic programs were ready to
load (via magnetic tape or paper tape) , that the technician
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was familiar with the diagnostic procedures published in the
Technical Manual, and that a complete spares kit was
available. If the trouble was isolated to a module which
was missing from the spares kit, the MTTR would necessarily
include time to procure the part.
The UYK-20 represented improvement over the
specification in the areas of speed, number of general
registers, instruction repertoir, weight and power
consumption. Weaknesses were in the memory addressing
scheme and interrupt structure. Some weaknesses in the I/O
structure were discussed . in Chapt. II. In addition, the
Central Processor (CP) and the I/O Controller (IOC) ended up
sharing the same memory port, with the IOC having priority
over the CP. An optional Direct Memory Access (DMA) channel
was provided, which accessed memory through a second memory
port. This minimized interference between the CP/IOC and
the DMA device, but the addition of the DMA capability added
about 65 nanoseconds to the memory cycle time. An
additional drawback was that the CP/IOC had priority over
the DMA in accessing any particular memory bank. Since many
accesses are sequential, . the CP could lock-out the DMA
device from memory. Although it was not mentioned in the
documentation, a jumper connection on a PC card could be
modified to give the CP/IOC and DMA memory ports equal
priority.
There was no provision to expand main memory beyond
65K-words.
Although multi-level indirect addressing was possible,
the procedure for implementation was awkward and involved
setting indirect control bits in a status register and
storing information in an Indirect Word.
Sixty-four page registers existed so that main memory
could be divided into 64 blocks of 1,024 words each. No
memory protection existed, however, which was necessary to
prevent inadvertant access to pages in memory by
unauthorized programs. Also missing was a provision for a
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privileged state (i.e. a set of privileged instructions
which could be reserved for use by a designated executive
program. The lack of those latter two capabilities
prevented the efficient implementation of program swapping
algorithms for multi-programming applications. Z z,~
usefulness of the page registers was thus limited.
The interrupt structure weakness primarily involved the
inability to nest interrupts. If an interrupt from one
class was interrupted by an interrupt from another higher
priority class (there were three classes) , the lower
priority interrupt would be saved while the higher priority
interrupt was processed. However, only one storage area for
saving status registers, program registers and real-tine
clock existed per interrupt class. If an interrupt
pre-empted another interrupt of the same class, tae saie
storage area would be reused and the previous program status
would be lost forever.
The instruction repertoir was extensive, reflecting the
capabilities of microprogrammed control. Instruct icr.s were
incorporated from the AN/OYK-15 (7) instruction set to ma'.e
the OTK-20 upward compatible with that machine. Although
not required by the specification, significant capability
for floating-point, mathematical and trigonometric functions
existed in an optional module cf microprogram routines
designated the MATHPAC. Also a7~i_5.nie as an option was 512
words of user specified microprogram routines, designated
the Hicrogrowth.
By 1976 there was available an extensive set of support
software [App. G], but it must be remembered that the first
systems only had an assembler program. The rest of tie
software was developed over the ensuing tnree fears.
Significant also was the fact that «r3P was much worse in
the early months than the 1500 hours demonstrated in 1976.
This section has briefly compared the AI/UTK-2C DPS -itn
the DRG's specification. In general more capability existed
in the final product than was originally requested, with
z z

some important exceptions. Ensuing discussions will compare
the UYK-20 with the "off-the-shelf" state-of-the-art in
minicomputer design in late-1 972/early-1973. The
discussions will provide further insight into the true
capabilities of the AN/UYK-20 DPS.
B. COMPARISON OF AN/UYK-20 DPS WITH THE 1972
"OFF-THE-SHELF" MINICOMPUTER STATE-OF-THE-ART
It has been stated previously that the standard
minicomputer specification may have been too restrictive.
If given the funding constraints, the acquisition strategy
had embodied design-to-cost concepts, for example, so that
the proposals could work toward the best system for the
money guided by a performance specification, the final
product may have looked much different. It would be
difficult to postulate the cost of militarizing any
particular commercially marketed computer system. It is
beyond the scope of this thesis to predict what the
proposals would have been, given the development funds and
production prices eventually realized. This section will,
however, discuss the technical possibilities available in
late-1972 and early-1973. The intent is to consider that
state-of-art which was through development and into
production about the time of the standard minicomputer
Request for Proposals (RFP) . The assumption is, as
previously stated, that the Navy wanted to minimize time and
development effort and so would look for a system which was
ready for market. The discussions will also provide a
further means of evaluating the AN/UYK-20 DPS. For
information, four minicomputers representing the 1972
technology are profiled in Apps. J through M.
1 . Architecture
Certainly the microprogrammed processor was the most
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common architecture in 1972 minicomputers. Of the four
examples, only the Digital Equipment Corporation PDP-11/45
was not microprogrammed. Microprogramming permitted a
reasonably powerful instruction repertoir while minimizing
size and electrical power consumption. Basically two types
of microprogramming were used. Horizontal microprogramming
utilized a long micro-instruction word where each bit
controlled a specific register-transfer function. The
Varian 73 with a 64-bit micro-instruction word was a good
example of that design concept. The Rolm 1602 with a 32-bit
micro- instruction word was a border line case. Vertical
microprogramming utilized shorter micro-instruction words
which required some hardware decoding in the control
process. The Hewlett Packard 2100A with a 24-bit
micro-instruction word and the UYK-20 with a 16-bit
microinstruction word are examples of vertical
microprogramming. The tradeoff between the two types was
more high-speed memory and simpler hardware logic for
horizontal versus less memory but more complex logic in the
case of vertical. A convenient capability in a
microprogrammed processor resulted from the use of Writable
Control Store (WCS) memory in place of Read-Only-Memory
(ROM) . WCS memory allowed the user to alter the
microprograms or add his own routines with the same ease
encountered in storing programs in Random Access Memory
(RAM) . By contrast, many ROM designs involved methods of
program storage which were unalterable. Some minicomputers
allowed a mixture of ROM and WCS in the control memory.
This feature was totally lacking in UYK-20, even in the User
Microgrowth section, which had to be factory produced. To
circumvent this problem, FCDSSA San Diego developed a device
called GENRAM which plugged into the User Microgrowth module
slot of the UYK-20. This device, along with a microcode
assembler, facilitated development and test of microprogram
routines for the UYK-20.
By contrast, the DEC PDP-11/45 achieved a powerful
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instruction set through hardware implemented logic. To do
so DEC sacrificed size and power consumption. By using
high-speed bipolar logic and Large-Scale-Integration, DEC
achieved much faster instruction execution speeds than
possible with a microprogrammed architecture. For example,
an Add instruction required only 0.3 usee contrasted with
0.75 usee for the same operation in OYK-20 or 1.96 usee in
HP2100A.
Another architecture feature available on
minicomputers in 1972 was register "push-pop" stacks. The
PDP-11/45 had an extensive stack, manipulation capability,
but it was also available in a more limited way on smaller
machines like the Rolm 1602. A "push-pop" stack was a group
of registers configured so that if a value was stored in the
top register, all previously stored values were
automatically "pushed" down to the register "below". If the
stack was referenced by an instruction, the "top" value
"popped" off and all values previously stored moved "up".
Actually the stack was implemented through the use of a
stack pointer register which always pointed to the "top"
register on the stack. This was a last-in-first-out sort of
operation. Stacks were useful for storing data that would
be used in a preset order, such as nesting interrupts where
the last machine state (values of the program counter,
status registers and other important data) were "pushed"
onto the stack, to be "popped" off when the last interrupt
finished processing. The OYK-20 had no stack capability.
Another architecture attribute was useful
particularly where programs had to be swapped on and off a
mass storage device as in a multi-programming environment.
That attribute was a Privileged State. Basically, a set of
instructions was provided which could only be executed while
in that special state. Instructions which stopped program
execution, altered memory assignments of programs, altered
memory protection, etc. would be part of a privileged
instruction set. Combined with features like memory protect
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and paging hardware, the existence of a privileged state
allowed powerful and efficient program swapping algorithms
to be implemented. A privileged state was generally found
only on larger machines like the PDP-11/45.
2« Main Memor y
Main memory generally was available in thr'ee types:
magnetic core. Metal Oxide Semiconductor (MOS) and bipolar
semiconductor. Core memory ranged in memory cycle speeds
from 0.6 usee to 1.5 usee while semiconductor memories
realized memory cycle speeds down to about 0.3 usee. The
tradeoff was that semiconductor memories were volatile,
reguiring additional power to refresh the data stored.
Power failure would result in the loss of all stored data
unless a backup battery power source was provided. Core
memories were non-volatile and would retain data for very
long periods of time. Core memories were generally less
expensive than semiconductor, although LSI techniques were
lowering the cost-per-bit of semiconductor memories
drastically. Many minicomputers, such as the Eolm 1602 and
the Varian 73, offered a mix of memory types.
Communications with memory were purposely designed to be
asynchronous (speed independent) to allow future plug-in of
higher speed memories as they became available. The UYK-20
utilized core memory only. Memory protection capability and
memory parity were not incorporated in the UYK-20 for
reasons discussed in Chapt. II, Sect. C. Those features
were available on some minicomputers (HP2100A and Varian 73)
and almost always incorporated on larger computers like the
PDP-11/45. Memory parity was usually implemented by the
addition of two bits per memory word (one parity bit for
each 8-bit byte) . Memory protect in minicomputers could be
implemented by a single register of one bit per memory block
or by one or more boundary registers which would contain the
address of the upper and/or lower boundary of a protected
memory block. Most minicomputers offered at least two
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memory ports (i.e. channels) through which to access memory.
The most common arrangement was for the CP to access memory
through one port and a DMA channel through another port.
Both the CP and the device on the DMA channel could access
memory at memory cycle speeds. HP2100A featured three ports
(two DMA channels plus CP) . Access speeds of 1,000K-words
per second were typical.
A feature within the minicomputer state-of-the-art,
but not often implemented, was interleaved memory. This
memory addressing scheme placed consecutive addresses in
different memory banks to eliminate one device locking out a
particular memory bank with a large number of consecutive
address accesses. PDP-11/45 featured interleaved memory as
an option.
The PDP--11 family of computers featured a unique
architecture attribute. DEC connected all functional
devices (CP, memory banks, I/O channels, DMA channels) to a
single data/address bus called a UNIBUS. Each functional
device was independent and could access any other device on
the UNIBDS independently. In the PDP-11/45 every general
register, memory location and I/O register was given equal
status as a location with an address. Signals to and from
all devices were multiplexed on the UNIBUS. PDP-11/45
realized data rates up to 2,500K-words per second with that
scheme.
3 • Instruction Set
As previously discussed, the size of the instruction
set was highly dependent on architecture. Microprogrammed
minicomputers featured far more powerful instruction sets
than purely hardware implemented architectures. Most
minicomputers offered single and double-word manipulation.
The HP2100A, PDP-11/45 and UYK-20 featured floating-point
instructions as an option. UYK-20 floating-point
instruction speeds were medium compared to other
minicomputers. For example, for a floating-point Add
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instruction the times were HP2100A: 23.5 usee to 59.8 usee}
OYK-20: 7.7 usee to 17.4 usee; PDP-11/45: 2.4 usee to 5.5
usee.
Bit manipulation capability was extensive on those
minicomputers designed for process control. For instance,
the Texas Instruments CP-960A was a bit oriented, rather
than a word oriented, machine. Some general purpose
minicomputers like the HP2100A and PDP-11/45 offered several
bit manipulation instructions (Test and Set, Compare, Reset,
etc.) . OYK-20 feature! those basic bit manipulation
functions except Test and Set which required two
instructions - very awkward in a real-time programming
environment. Byte manipulation was a necessary capability
for real-time processing, expecially for data communications
applications. OYK-20 possessed some capability (Load, Load
and Index, Store, Add, Subtract, Compare, Compare and
Index) . The use of those byte manipulation instructions was
necessarily awkward since the OYK-20 was a word oriented
rather than a byte oriented machine. That is, each
consecutive address referenced a full word. It was
necessary to indicate by setting a bit in a register which
of the two bytes in the word addressed was desired. Byte
manipulation instructions were not, however, a common
feature of commercial general-purpose minicomputers.
Another feature not commonly found on minicomputers
was the implementation of trigonometric and hyperbolic
functions as machine instructions. Through MATHPAC a useful
set of such functions was available on OYK-20 as an option.
Some available microprogrammed machines featured extra
control storage capacity where users could implement such
functions.
A capability available on some minicomputers, but
totally lacking on OYK-20, was memory-to-raemory
instructions. That is, the capability to perform operations
on data in memory and return the result to memory without
first loading the data into a register. Varian 73 and
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PDP-11/45 both featured some memory-to-memory capability,
but in UYK-20 all data had to be first loaded into a
register to perform further operations.
^ • Input/Output
The most popular I/O scheme in 1972 minicomputers
featured a single I/O bus. In a single I/O bus structured
machine, data transfer was generally controlled by the CP.
Data rates were slow (300K- to UOOK-words per second) .
Generally a number of peripherals could be interfaced on the
I/O bus. The Rolm 1602 could support up to 61 devices, but
the HP2100A only 14., Varian 73 was also a single I/O bus
structured machine. Such machines usually featured at least
one DMA channel. The Varian 73 featured a Priority Memory
Access (PMA) channel which allowed data transfers up to
3,300K-words per second when semiconductor memory as
installed. A typical DM& channel data rate was 1,000K-words
per second.
The processor independent IOC featured on the UYK-20
made that I/O scheme more powerful than found on most
minicomputers. The IOC acted as an independent processor
with its own control memory and instruction set. Each group
of four channels contained its own arithmetic unit and
registers and so could operate independently once data
transfer was initiated by the IOC. One drawback was that
the IOC shared a memory port with the CP. Another was that
four channels shared an arithmetic unit and registers so
that all channels of one group had to be of the same type.
The instruction set implemented in the IOC was minimal.
Data manipulation had to be performed by the CP.
Again, the PDP-11/45 UNIBUS structure was a unique
approach. Each peripheral device was interfaced to the bus
through its own independent controller. Thus, every I/O
channel was a DMA channel. In addition, each device could
communicate independently with another device. Every device
on the UNIBUS, including the CP, was assigned a priority.
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Communications were handled according to priority by a
ONIBUS Priority Arbitration Unit. By that system, I/O
transfers were handled indentically to memory accesses.
Thus, every instruction implemented on the PDP-11/45 could
be used in an I/O program to manipulate data.
5» Interrupt Structure
Some 1972 minicomputers featured a priority
interrupt structure. As previously discussed, minicomputers
with stack architecture generally featured multi-level
interrupt nesting capability. On other machines nesting was
accomplished by providing storage area for machine status
for each interrupt line. Two methods of handling interrupts
were common. The first involved branching to a specific
memory word assigned to the interrupt, which contained the
address of the interrupt service routine. The second
allowed a direct branch to the interrupt service routine.
The latter method was faster, but reguired more hardware
logic. UYK-20 implemented the former scheme.
On UYK-20, as previously discussed, only three
storage areas were provided to store machine status (one per
interrupt class) so that nesting capability was severely
limited.
6 • Construction
The term "modular construction" had different
connotations with different manufacturers. The most common
scheme featured a simple backpanel which provided only power
lines, data and address buses, etc., which were common to
all printed circuit (PC) card modules. All PC cards were
the same size and could be plugged into any slot. Circuits
on a particular PC card related to functional catagories,
there being one PC card for the CP, one for memory control
circuits, one for each memory bank, and one for each I/O
device interface. HP2100A, Rolm 1602 and Varian 73 were
configured in that manner. The PDP-11/45 also was similarly
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configured, although backpanel wiring was more complex due
to the ONIBUS structure. PC cards were generally large and
were structurally reinforced for strength.
UYK-20 featured an entirely different approach. PC
card modules were utilized, but cards were small and were
hardware type oriented rather than functionally oriented.
For instance, control memory and associated circuitry
accupied four PC cards, the master clock occupied another,
interrupt storage another, and each general register set
(two sets of 16 registers each) occupied a card. The UYK-20
scheme facilitated the installation of plug-in options that
were available [App. I], but created a complicated wiring
situation on the backpanel and greatly increased the number
of different types of PC cards utilized. The maintenance
plan where a majority of the PC cards were "throw-away"
modules (i.e. those cards could be discarded when found to
be defective) also depended on that scheme. Naturally, a PC
card containing an entire processor would be too expensive
to discard. The repairable PC cards in the OYK-20 were
those few that were large and functionally oriented - Memory
Array Boards, Memory Control Boards and I/O Interface cards.
Those generally were inadequately reinforced, tended to
bend, and were extremely difficult to remove and install.
Interestingly, the Holm 1602 featured large functionally
oriented cards and met all military specification
requirements including shock and vibration testing. That
computer was service approved and designated AN/UYK-1 9 (V)
.
A significant achievement by Rolm in the 1602 design
was a demonstrated MTBF of 11,000 hours. Since the OYK-20
experienced significant reliability problems, it would be
informative to investigate the differences in those two
computers. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to present
a detailed analysis of the impact of the design and
construction of the two machines on their demonstrated
reliability. Some major points can be made, however. The
logic design itself was a contributor to UYK-20*s
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reliability problems. Por example, the TAAF program
conducted at Naval Weapons Center Dahlgren revealed that the
master clock and certain logic gates in the UIK-20 were
overloaded. A user reported that the MIL-STD-188C
asynchronous, serial I/O interface card was defective in
that the channel would interrupt on both leading and
trailing edges of an interrupt signal pulse. Those were
basic logic design problems and would directly contribute to
module failures. Construction and reinforcement of larger
PC cards was inadequate in UYK-20. With frequent handling
such cards suffered broken components, jumper wires, printed
circuit runs and connection pins. All such occurrences
created circuit failures which lowered MTBF. In a complex
backpanel wiring situation, lack of adequate quality
assurance measures could allow wiring errors to pass
unnoticed. Such errors could appear as circuit failures
under troubleshooting procedures utilizing diagnostic
software. Over the three years after contract award, UNIVAC
had corrected many of those sorts of problems. let the MTBF
had risen to only 1500 hours. The reason for that may lie
in the selection and integration of components. The ability
for a manufacturer to control the quality of components used
in producing computers would directly impact on reliability.
In producing the 1602, Rolm Corporation had that control.
Most components in UYK-20 were procured under military
specifications (with tha exception of integrated circuits)
.
Such components must be procured from a Qualified Parts List
(QPL) vendor under military specification control. In that
situation UNIVAC had no control over component quality.
Hardware engineers interviewed generally agreed that many
components procured under military specifications probably
exhibited MTBF's in the hundreds of hours.
7. Support Software
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to present a
detailed analysis of the available minicomputer support
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software in 1972. Some comments can be made about
availability, however. As indicated in Apps. J through M,
commercial minicomputers generally featured a complete set
of software. In most cases a minicomputer was upward
compatible with earlier models, so that each inherited a
package of well tested and fully documented support
software. New software nodules could be added at leisure to
take advantage of the added capabilities of the more
advanced machine.
Most software engineers interviewed agreed that
adeguate operational testing was difficult to achieve.
Complete debug of a software module depended on extensive
use in the field. Naturally, any software package inherited
from a market-tested computer had that advantage.
The 'UYK-20 computer did not have that advantage.
Although upward compatible with the AN/UYK-15(V) [App. D],
that machine did not possess a complete package of support
software and had not had extensive use. Support software
for UYK-20 was developed during the three years following
contract award. As of mid-1976 the CMS-2M compiler and
SDEX-20 real-time executive were still in the "user debug"
stage. All software was still receiving enhancements to
upgrade capability as fuQds became available.
The foregoing material in this thesis has discussed
the events which occurred in the AN/DYK-20 DPS acquisition
history and the technical advantages and drawbacks of the
system. The final section in this chapter will discuss the
impact of those events, advantages and disadvantages on the
users and their tactical system development efforts.
C IMPACT OF AN/UYK-20 DPS ON DEVELOPMENT OF USER SYSTEMS
The events of the three years after contract award,
which have been referred to a "growing pains", had a
significant impact on the efforts of users to develop
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tactical systems utilizing UYK-20 as a system component.
This section will discuss the various ways which that system
component aided or complicated those development efforts
during the period mid-1973 to mid-1976.
1. Establishment of AN/UYK-20 as a Sta ndard
The implications of establishing a "standard" system
component were discussed in Chapt. II, Sect. B. For those
programs well into development with another minicomputer and
/or programming language, the impact on acquisition cost and
schedule to switch to UYK-20 was significant. One project
reported a two year schedule slip and software costs of
$350,000 to $400,000 to reprogram for the UYK-20. Since
that system involved primarily data-handling, only limited
processing power and core memory capacity were needed. A
lower cost processor with 4K-words of memory and unit cost
of $15,000 was replaced by a minimum configuration UYK-20
with 8K-words of memory and unit cost of $24,000. Another
project reported a four to five month slip and $4 00,000 to
$500,000 cost to reprogram with C&S-2M, the standard
high-level language.
The trade-off for those projects was to lower
life-cycle costs through savings in ILS costs, training
costs, etc. as previously discussed. Unfortunately, the
immediate concern was always initial acquisition cost,
schedule, and performance. While life-cycle cost was given
lip-service, a project's success was ultimately measured by
success in those three areas. Thus, imposition of the
standard on a system well into development impacted directly
on the measure of the project's success.
Because of the necessity to identify firm
requirements for UYK-20 production units, and to obtain OSMN
funds through the surcharge scheme, NAVELEX was forced to
require those projects to switch to UYK-20.
The technical drawback of adopting a standard was
that the UYK-20 might not be specifically suited for a
68

particular application. An example might be an engine
monitoring and control system where a powerful bit
manipulation capability was needed. That project would be
reguired to use UYK-20 regard-less of the minimal bit
manipulation capability. Interestingly, no project
personnel found the UJK-20 totally unsuited for their
application. It has been reported that as of mid- 1976 over
100 projects were utilizing OYK-20. Tasks included the
following diverse sorts of requirements:
* Message Processing Systems
Low memory capacity (8K- to 16K-words)
Low computing power
High I/O capacity (12 to 16 channels)
High data rates
* Navigational Systems
• Medium memory capacity (16K- to 32K-words)
32-bit (double word) I/O transfer
32-bit data manipulation
Floating-point trigonometric and hyperbolic
functions
High accuracy (up to 24-bits per data word
preferred)
Low I/O capacity (4 to 8 channels)
* Signal Analysis Systems
Large storage capacity (65K-words of memory plus




High throughput (instruction execution rate)
High I/O data rates
m High I/O capacity (8 to 16 channels)
* Target Tracking and Fire Control Systems
32K- to 65K-words of storage capacity
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12 to 16 I/O channels
Mass storage device (disk) on DMA channel
Floating-point and trigonometric functions
High throughput (instruction execution rate)
Special user functions implemented through
Microgrowth
It was a significant accomplishment, and spoke well for the
DRG specification, that JYK-20 was able to handle those and
many other diverse tasks.
The conclusion was that few projects were severely
impacted by imposition of a standard minicomputer.
Unfortunately, that statement could not be made about
UYK-20, the computer that became the standard.
2- Hardware/F irmware Ca pabilities
Users generally found the UYK-20 architecture
powerful enough for their needs. Local Jumps, Load Multiple
and Store Multiple instructions not common on minicomputers
were very useful. The availability of 32 general registers
was a powerful programming aid. I/O structure was versatile
and powerful with the processor independent IOC. Certain
attributes caused some inconvenience, however.
The awkward byte addressing scheme discussed in the
previous section would add an additional instruction to byte
manipulation operations in order to set the upper/lower byte
indicator. Execution time for the byte operation would be
increased about 50% and program storage requirements
doubled. One solution was to write self-modifying code, to
modify the byte manipulation instructions "on-the-fly".
This created programs which were very hard to debug. Also,
such code was non- reentrant ; i.e. it could not be reused
without reloading the original program from an external
device, and it could not be shared in a multi-programming
environment.
Lack of memory-to-memory instructions added Load and
70

Store instructions to those operations because of the need
to put the data in registers. About 1.5 usee was added to
the execution time for memory-to-memory operations, and
program storage requirements were tripled. Lack of a Test
and Set instruction (that operation required two
instructions in UYK-20) could cause major problems. If an
interrupt occurred between the two instructions, which
changed the value that was being tested, then the test
already performed was invalid. The routine executing the
Test and Set instructions would not be aware of the change
and would proceed on the basis of the original test results
when the interrupt finished processing. The solution was to
lockout interrupts before executing the Test and Set
instructions and to restore interrupts after completing the
Test and Set. That solution added two to four instructions
and 3.3 to 4.8 usee to a Test and Set operation.
There were no absolute compare instructions in
UYK-20. When comparing two words, the most significant bit
would always be considered the sign. To compare a 16-bit
absolute word a double-word operation was needed. Time and
storage requirements were thus again added to the user
program.
The sum total of those sorts of deficiencies
significantly decreased throughput and increased storage
requirements. The solution was to implement the missing
capabilities in the User Hicrogrowth area of control memory.
Such a development effort had to be user funded, however.
As an example, one activity received a quotation of $50,000
to implement four instructions in Microgrowth:
* Increment and Store Memory
* Literal Add to Memory
* Add to Memory
* Literal Store to Memory
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In addition, an extra $1,000 was added to the price of each
production unit. Many projects preferred to suffer the
inconvenience rather than pay the price.
For those systems with large storage requirements
and a large number of tasks which could be performed
simultaneously, the lack of proper tools to implement
multi-programming was a serious drawback. Although page
registers existed, there was no privileged instructions or
memory protection with which to implement sophisticated page
swapping algorithms. The alternatives required more time
and tied up valuable storage space, both expensive
commodities in time-critical, real-time applications.
The storage capacity problem could have been
relieved in some cases if a provision to expand memory
beyond 65K-words had existed. Alternatives involved adding
additional OYK-20 1 s to the system, which was expensive if
the additional processing power was not also needed, or
adding a mass storage device on the DMA channel, which would
often not meet speed requirements. To solve the dilemma in
one case, a semiconductor memory disk emulator was conceived
which would interface to the computer through the DMA
channel. Ability to utilize semiconductor memory in place
of core memory would have alleviated some similar problems
if that capability had existed.
A capacity problem also plagued some projects in the
I/O area. Although the processor independent IOC provided
powerful I/O capabilities, only 16 channels were available,
with the type configuration constraints previously
discussed. To get more capacity required multiplexing on a
channel, which slowed down th data rate, or adding more
0YK-20's to the system.
Certain I/O configurations would have benefited from
complete independence of the two sides of a duplex channel.
However, both sides shared registers and could not be
cleared independently. Several users stated the need to
write extra routines to prevent losing data on one side if
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the need arose to clear the other side of a channel.
A characteristic of serial, synchronous interface
channels was that the first few characters transmitted were
"garbage" due to the need to establish synchronization.
This situation could not be tolerated on a radio (RF) data
channel where good data would be lost. The solution was to
alter the RF Data Channel hardware.
A common complaint from development programmers was
the inadeguacy of the Maintenance Panel for software
debugging. Lack of I/O status indicators and
multiple-register displays were cited as drawbacks. The
maintenance panel had too much capability for hardware
troubleshooting, but not enough for program debug. A
solution would have been to reduce the capability of the
maintenance panel and provide a plug-in software debug
panel. The lack of I/O status indicators was a serious
problem since, with the IOC independent of the processor,
there was no way to determine if an I/O transfer was
actually taking place after it was initiated.
Lack of interrupt nesting capability was a major
concern to development programmers. Care had to be
exercised so that multiple interrupts occuring in one class
would not store over the original machine status, thus
preventing a return to the interrupted routine. The
solution was usually to lock-out other interrupts, which
virtually nullified the priority interrupt capability.
Real-time programs were generally interrupt driven, thus,
loss of priority interrupt capability was a serious
drawback.
The awkwardness of using the indirect addressing
capability caused some programmers to abandon its use in
favor of direct addressing with indexing.
3. Availability of Support Software
The support software for the AN/UYK-20 DPS was slow
in coming. Those programs in development in late-1973.
73

which were forced to switch to UYK-20, had only a limited
capability assembler. As a result, many created their own
program development capability. Doing that added to the
time and cost of a system since operational program
development would cease while programmers wrote monitors,
assemblers, editors, debug routines, etc. As an example,
the cost of developing an assembler was $5,000 to $100,000
depending on its capability. It was cheaper and faster to
write your own, however, than to wait for the Level I and
Level II systems to be released and debugged.
The late delivery of CMS-2M (early- 1975) caused
two-fold problems. Many early operational programs for
UYK-20 had to be written in assembly language. Since it
took the same time for a programmer to code one line of
assembly language as to code one line of a high-level
language (with a ratio of about six assembly language
instructions to one high-level language instruction) , the
cost was significant. Those projects which elected to start
development with another high-level language (usually
FORTRAN) faced the prospect of reprogramming in CMS-2M when
that compiler became available.
The whole question of program development facilities
for a minicomputer is worth some discussion. It was
generally not possible to configure a small computer for
efficient program development. Level II Operating System,
which was self- hosted on the UYK-20, could support, only one
programmer at a time. Although both interactive and batch
mode's were provided, compile times were slow and debug
facilities were minimal. What was generally needed was a
larger computer with a time-sharing monitor so that several
programmers could work simultaneously. An ideal system
would feature cross-assemblers and compilers to generate
object code for the small computer. Adequate memory, disk
storage and a number of program development aids such as a
text editor, debug utilities, data conversion routines, etc.
would be a necessity. A program to emulate the small
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computer would be useful for initial debugging of
operational software.
A few activities which were to do extensive program
development for the UYK-20 did create such systems. The
Electromagnetic Systems Laboratory in Sunnyvale set up a
time-sharing system on a Hewlett Packard 3000 computer. The
system featured a direct link to a UYK-20 computer via a
special intercomputer 1/3 channel. Source code generated on
the HP3000 could be loaded directly into the UYK-20 for
assembly or compiling. The Autonetics Division of North
American Rockwell set up a similar system based on a
PDP-11/45 computer. FCDSSA San Diego developed the
CMS-2Y(20) compiler for use on an AN/OYK-7 computer under
the SHARE/7 time-sharing system as an aid to their software
development and maintenance efforts.
Such systems were understandably costly to set up.
In addition, the hardware and associated software to
interface the system directly to a UYK-20 had to be
developed in-house. The project sponsoring the development
had to provide the funds. The dilemma facing the project
manager was whether it was more cost effective to fund a
program development facility or to provide a self-hosted
system for the UYK-20 and suffer the inefficiencies. As an
example, the price of a self-hosted system with Level II and
CMS-2M would be about $150,000 including peripherals. At
the other end of the price spectrum, the UYK-7 hosted system
would cost about $800,000. Commercial systems would be
priced in between depending on capability.
To provide program development facilities and save
projects the cost of support software and peripherals, a
System Design Laboratory (SDL) was conceived by the Naval
Electronics Laboratory Center. That was a commercial
computer based time-sharing system with cross-assemblers,
compilers and an emulator for UYK-20. The system could be
accessed via the ARPANET, a commercial nationwide computer
network linked by leased telephone lines. Anticipated
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drawbacks of that scheme were possible demand beyond the
system capacity, and the fact that classified programs could
not be developed on the system. In fact, the majority of
projects depended on the self-hosted system. The
non-availability of a well-tested, complete, self-hosted
program development system at the outset impacted
significantly on both cost and schedule of projects.
<l. Support Software Capabilities
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to present a
detailed analysis of the impact of support software
capabilities on program development. However, certain
points brought out by development programmers are worth some
discussion.
A dynamic debug capability was needed under Level
II. As of mid-1976 the development of this capability was
planned, but funds were not available. Dynamic debug
capability would allow programmers to perform analysis on an
executing program without interfering with its execution.
CMS-2M listings of source code and object code were
not produced side-by~side, making cross-referencing awkward
and time consuming.
CMS-2H depended on the trigonometric and hyperbolic
functions provided through MATHPAC. Accuracy provided was
insufficient in some applications. The large variety of
useful functions and routines developed for a well-used
language like FORTRAN were not available with CMS-2M.
Because that language anticipated restricted usage, such a
library of routines would never be created, forcing the
development programmer to write his own routines when
needed. In recognition of this problem, the User's Group
Software Directory and the Software Repository mentioned in
Chapter III were an attempt to prevent redundant development
of such routines.
CMS-2M was not aa optimizing compiler. Because many
operational programs are time-critical and have large
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storage requirements, it would have been useful to have an
optimizing version of the CMS-2M compiler to minimize use of
those assets.
Like any general purpose real-time executive,
SDEX-20 required too much core and system overhead (time
spent in executing the executive software) to be widely
useful. Those applications with time-critical routines and
large storage requirements were forced to write their own
real-time monitors. By writing an executive in-house it
could be optimized for the particular application, thus
minimizing storage and overhead. Many programmers felt that
a general purpose real-time executive would be useful if the
source code were available to programmers as a reference to
aid in writing their own. The low usage of SDEX-20 raised
the question of the cost-effectiveness of supplying that
type of support software.
5- Av ailability of Peripherals
The peripherals problem is actually divided into two
catagories: peripherals for program development, and
peripherals for tactical systems. Up to mid- 1976 no
standard militarized peripherals were available for
purchase, except keyboard/printers and paper tape
reader/punches which had been in existance for several
years. Those units ware generally too large for a
minicomputer installation. Even with the introduction of
the Alphanumeric Display Device (ADD) and the Cartridge
Magnetic Tape Unit (CMTO) in mid-1976, important peripherals
were still lacking, such as a magnetic tape unit
(reel-to-reel) , a disk storage device, and a graphics
display terminal. Projects were forced to fund
militarizaiori of their own peripherals, which created the
same sort of proliferation problem encountared with
minicomputers in the early 1970' s.
During the early production period in late-1973,
only UNIVAC peripherals could be interfaced with the OYK-20
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for program development. Those peripherals were generally
too large and expensive for a minicomputer system, so
projects began acquiring their own. Costs of procuring
peripherals included development of device software modules
to interface with the UYK-20 operating systems. The
acquisition of peripherals to be used for program
development was costly, especially since those peripherals
would in general not be used in the tactical system itself.
Projects were wise to retain a OYK-20 system with
peripherals configured for program development to be
provided as Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) for future
development efforts.
6 « Hardware and Software Reliability and
Maintainability
The acute quality and reliability problems
experienced in the AN/OYK-20 DPS were reported in Chapter
III. It was those problems that had the most profound
impact on user development efforts.
The programs developing in mid-to-late- 1 973 were
forced to use Functional Demonstration Models (FDM f s) and
Advanced Production Engineering Models (APE's) in order to
meet development schedules. That hardware was essentially
not ready for release. The numerous deficiencies and
failures caused significant down time. Projects were forced
to purchase two computers and cannabilize one to keep the
other running. Early production units had similar problems.
Software debugging on faulty hardware was a difficult and
time-consuming task. One activity reported expending three
man-months of labor trying to debug a program when the
problem was actually in the interrupt hardware.
Efforts to troubleshoot faulty hardware were
hampered by faulty spares in the spare parts kits. The kits
were expensive ($13,000 each) so that project managers were
unwilling to purchase sufficient numbers. Project personnel
estimated that one spares kit per computer was necessary to
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ensure parts availability. Memory Array Boards, which
experienced very high failure rates, were repairable modules
and were not included in the spares kits. Since the time to
ship the repairable modules back to ONIVAC for repair and
return was running six to eight weeks, activities were
forced to purchase extra Memory Array Boards (at $1,300
each) to minimize down time.
It was more timely and cost effective for some
activities, like NESEC San Diego, to do their own hardware
trouble-shooting and repair, rather than call in ONIVAC
engineers. The diagnostic software and documentation was
not well suited to this effort. The diagnostic routines
could isolate circuit board failures, but not design
problems which plagued the earlier machines. Activities
turned to logic circuit diagrams, but found that those also
contained errors. It was difficult to maintain accurate
up-to-date files of logic circuit diagrams since no formal
system existed for procuring them.
Early releases of the support software had many
errors. User activities attempting to debug the software
were hampered by inadequate and erroneous documentation.
Source code was not available initially to aid in their
efforts. After repeated demands the source code for the
operating systems was made available, but coda for the
compilers was withheld as a matter of proprietary
information. Most software engineers interviewed expressed
the opinion that the support software source code, including
compilers, should be purchased outright by the Navy so that
it could be made available to users. That was especially
true when the support software contained so many errors and
the documentation was inadequate. In many cases programmers
had to resort to the source code to determine the details of
system software operation. One activity reported that it
was once forced to reprogram to take advantage of an
assembler capability which was not mentioned in the
documentation. A basic problem with software documentation
79

was that no detailed discussions of software philosophy were
presented. Adding the problems in the software on top of
problems in the hardware made an extremely difficult
situation for programmers attempting to debug operational
software.
7. Lack of Dedicated Appropriated Funds to Support the
AN/0YK-2C DPS
It is significant that a majority of problems were
corrected when usage was sufficient to isolate those
problems. Given time the support software became available.
Given time the standard peripherals would be available. If
NAVELEX could have waited until the system was adequately
tested before release, much of the inconvenience caused to
users would have been eliminated. The reason that NAVELEX
could not wait was lack of funding. It was necessary to
identify specific requirements for production units and to
receive orders for the system in order to get the surcharge
that paid for project support. NAVELEX was thus forced to
require the use of the system before it was ready. An
obvious solution was to wait until funding for the entire
acquisition cycle was reasonably assured (another year at
best)
. Then wait until the system was complete, including
software and testing, before releasing it (another two to
three years) . Of course, a three to four year delay would
have brought proliferatioa of minicomputer types in the Navy
inventory to an unacceptable level. Some of that delay
might have been saved by purchasing a "market-tested"
computer system, then militarizing it. At least the
reliable commercial equivalent would have been available for
use in development until the militarized version was
available. Certainly computer systems existed which could
meet Navy performance requirements.
The lack of dedicated funds has thus been identified
as the prime-mover in many events in the history of the
AN/UYK-20 DPS acquisition. The final chapter will summarize
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and present some recommendations which might prove useful in
future tactical processor acquisitions.
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In 1972, when proliferation of minicomputer types in the
Navy inventory was perceived to be a significant problem,
the Tactical Digital Systems Office (TADSO) of the Naval
Material Command (NAVMAT) conceived the procurement of a
standard minicomputer. Use of that minicomputer was
reguired in all tactical systems reguiring a small computer
unless sufficient justification was given to use a different
computer.
Although no funds had been appropriated for such a
procurement, NAVMAT, with the approval of the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO)
,
proceeded to initiate the procurement
action by reprogramming a minimum of Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation Navy (RDTSEN) appropriated funds from
anticipated user projects. A Design Review Group (DRG) was
convened, and a fairly restrictive technical specification
was drawn up. With the exception of an assembler, support
software reguirements were missing entirely from the
specification. At that point the Navy was procuring
one-half of a minicomputer system with no funds appropriated
for future support. The necessity to get support funds
forced NAVMAT to reguire projects still in their development
phase to include the standard minicomputer immediately in
their program and to assess a surcharge on purchases of
standard minicomputer hardware and software.
The contract award went to the lowest bidder, UNIVAC
Defense Systems Division of Sperry-Rand Corporation. The
DRG specification appeared to be influenced by the UNIVAC
design philosophy, owing to the large number of UNIVAC
computers in the Navy inventory.
Although the original acguisition strategy intended that
the minicomputer system be a militarized off-the-shelf
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commercial system, UNI7AC won the competition with a new
design that had never been in production and was not upward
compatible with any well-established family of computers.
In order to meet user project development schedules, the
first Functional Development Models (FDM) (non-militarized
prototypes) were delivered within 120 days after contract
award and the first Advanced Production Engineering Models
(APE) (militarized prototypes) within nine months after
contract award. Although the hardware design held the
potential for good capabilities in a minicomputer, the
FDM f s, APE's and early production units were inadequately
tested and debugged. Reliability was very low and
maintainability suffered from inadequate diagnostic
programs, poor documentation, faulty spares, and excessive
turnaround time on repairable modules.
Initially software was non-existent; when released it
was inadequately tested and debugged. User efforts to use
the software were hampered by poor documentation.
Thus, lack of dedicated funding forced users to utilize
the standard minicomputer as a system component before it
was ready. The result was significant labor costs to cope
with the problems and increased risks in the development of
operational programs.
It was mid-1976, three years after contract award,
before the system was sufficiently reliable and possessed
adequate support software to be considered a viable system
component in a developing tactical system.
It must be recognized that follow-on standard tactical
digital processors may not be minicomputers. Perhaps the
design will be a distributed microprocessor system or some
architecture not yet conceived. The rapid advance in the
state-of-the-art of digital processors makes the
possibilities endless. The events connected with the
standard minicomputer acguisition do foster, however, some
conclusions and recommendations pertinent to future




1« The life-cycle cost and logistics support
considerations make adoption of standards necessary.
2. The decision as to how often to reprocure a standard
involves a tradeoff between two alternatives: (1)
reprocuring rapidly enough to keep up with advances in the
state-of-the-art, and (2) producing a particular standard
long enough to maximize the economic benefit of large-scale
production. The tolerance of tactical system development
engineers for using an "old" standard must also be taken
into account. That decision must be made on the basis of
factors such as availability of funds and how well the
current standard is performing at the time.
3. The primary goal of the standard minicomputer
acquisition strategy was to stem the proliferation of
minicomputer types in the Navy inventory. That goal was
accomplished at the expense of significant adverse impact on
the costs and schedule of user projects. It is this
authors opinion that the "cost" of the adverse impact
outweighed the benefit of minimizing proliferation. It
should be the primary goal of future tactical digital
processor acquisitions to deliver a highly reliable system
complete with support software and accurate documentation.
That would be simply applying current systems engineering
management and Integrated Logistics Support policies.
4. The standard minicomputer procurement was totally
dependent on user projects for both development and
operational support funding. That fact was the underlying
reason why projects were forced to use the system before it
was ready, accounting for most of the events which impacted
adversely on those user projects. The availability of both
RDT&EN and OSMN funding for a standard tactical digital
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processor acquisition should be reasonably assured prior to
contract award. Based on experience with the standard
minicomputer acquisition, contract award should be planned
for two to three years prior to required delivery of the
militarized version to the fleet.
5. Since it would be desirable to minimize the time
between contract award and delivery to the fleet, the
acquisition strateqy should stronqly consider procurement of
an off-the-shelf, market-tested system which exhibits a
strong heritage from a successful family of processors.
Availability of software should be a major consideration.
It is this author's opinion that the strong competition in
the digital equipment industry assures that new commercial
systems push the state-of-the-art while at the same time
exhibiting reliable hardware and software performance. The
strategy just suggested should thus suffer minimal risk of
early obsolescence. This strategy would also insure the
immediate availability of FDM's for use in development.
6. Award of contract in the standard minicomputer
procurement was based on two factors, (1) technical
responsiveness and (2) lowest price proposal. Such a
strategy precludes consideration of which proposal presents
the best reliability and performance for the price. Future
acquisition strategies should require a fully negotiated
procurement based on a performance specification. Such a
strategy would give the Source Selection Evaluation Board
the flexibility to consider both design and price.
Proposals offering market-tested systems could be weighted
heavily since such systems have usage data to prove
reliability and performance.
7. Despite the fact that a pre-award survey found all
companies submitting proposals to be responsive, the winner
experienced immediate and severe quality assuranca problems.
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Those QA problems had a profound impact on user development
efforts. Future pre-award surveys should firmly establish
the potential contractors 1 abilities to produce a reliable
product. Careful evaluation of quality control standards
should be made to assure that those standards will insure
delivery of a reliable product.
8. The Requirements, Indefinite Delivery contract awarded
in the standard minicomputer acquisition was. well-suited as
a production contract and should be utilized in future
procurements of standard equipment.
9. The imposition of military specifications on a
commercial design creates some risk in the development area.
Future acquisition strategy should consider awarding a cost
type development contract for the militarization effort.
Funds permitting, the award of such a contract to several
companies would permit a "fly-off", ensuring competition for
the production contract.
10. As tactical digital processors become smaller due to
advances in Large Scale Integration techniques, the need for
non-self-hosted program development facilities becomes more
important. Future acquisitions of tactical digital
processors should consider award of a separate fixed-price
contract for a program development system to support the
standard digital processor. Certain digital equipment
companies specialize in design, integration, and production
of such specialized systems from off-the-shelf components,
so that adequate competition should exist for such a
procurement.
11. The maintenance and control panels on the AN/UYK-20
computer did not provide adequate capabilities for software
test and debug. Future systems should include a plug-in
software debug console to provide this capability.
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12. A generalized real-time executive may occupy too much
core, and require too much system overhead to be widely
useful in a tactical system environment. Such software
could be better optimized in designs tailored for the
specific application. Future acquisitions should not
include a standard real-time executive with the support
software, but should provide some means (such as the
Software Repository) by which projects are made aware of
such software developed by other users.
13. Software development engineers interviewed stated that
source code for the various support software, including
assemblers and compilers, was a useful tool to aid in
debugging operational programs. Knowledge of the source
code would allow the developer to determine the exact
operation of the software and the philosophy behind its
design. Future acquisition strategies should include
outright purchase of the data rights to all software as well














































527 to 1,139 lbs.
1,720 to 6,000 watts
32-bits


































































































































































No. of Channels 16
Types of Channels Ser/Par/DMA




Multi-register displays Not req'd












Debug Routines Not req'd
Operating Systems Not req'd
Real-Time OS Not req'd
Interrupts
Priority Structure Yes















































































No. of Channels 16
Types of Channels Parallel
Maximum Data Hate Unknown
Processor Independent No
Maintenance/Control Panel
Location Front of Cabinet
Multi-register displays Yes




















































































































































































































































































































































































































* Written in FORTRAN IV except for the macro-assembler
which is written in UNIVAC 1108 assembly language.
L^l^I I Operating System
* Equipment Configuration
> AN/DYK-20 (V) hosted (a minimum of 24K-words of
memory required)
Paper Tape Reader/Punch (required)
Keyboard/Printer (required)








Text Editor (edits source code)
Linking-Loader Subsystem (loads relocatable
object code into memory)
Debug Dtility system (memory inspect and change,
absolute core dump or load, absolute correction
load, snapshot dump, memory search and constant
storage)
System Tape Generator
Basic Assembler (generates relocatable object
code - no macro capability)
* Written in FORTRAN 17
Level II Operating System
* Equipment Configuration




Four Magnetic Tape Units (required)
* System Routines
Core-Resident Routines (system controller, I/O
controller, batch monitor)
ULTRA-16 Macro-Assembler (generates relocatable
object code)
CMS-2M Compiler
a FORTRAN IV Compiler
Linking Loader (loads relocatable object code)
Debug Utilities (memory inspect and change,
memory dump, absolute core dump or load, absolute
correction load, snap-shot dump, memory search,
and constant storage)
Conversion Subroutines (ASCII decimal integer to
binary integer and vv., ASCII characters to field




General Utilities (transfer data from one
peripheral device to another)
Librarian (edit and update user source code,
i




* CMS-2M language is a subset of CMS-2, the standard
Navy high-level language for tactical applications.






Four Magnetic Tape Units
* Host Computers




* Incorporates capabilities for both scientific
calculation and data management.
* Uses familiar English words and algebraic expressions
to define and describe logical operations and data
manipulations.
* Components
Lexical Analyser - prepares source code input for
translation
Syntax Analyser - translates source code into
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intermediate language and generates error
messages.
Direct Code Processor - translates direct code
into intermediate language
Code Generator - translates intermediate language
code into relocatable object code
Output Editor - produces hardcopy listings
Machine Independent System Generator
* Produces system tapes for AN/UYK-20 (V) from object




SDSX-2 Real-Tim e Executive
* Peripheral suite as specified by the user
* Building block modules provide basic computer program

















Interfaces with CMS-2Y (7) Librarian for source
code editing
Extensive Optimization








































































































































* 16 General Registers
* Bootstrap ROM - two programs for channels and
peripheral devices selected by the user
* 8K-words of Core Memory
* Power Supply as specified by the user:
Single phase, 115 volts, 60 or 400 hertz
Three phase delta, 115 volts, 60 or 400 hertz
Three phase wye, 208 volts, 60 or 400 hertz
* Four Input/Output Channels (one group) as specified
by the user:
MIL-STD-188C Synchronous (0 to 9600 baud)
• MIL-STD-188C Asynchronous (four rates of 75, 150,
300, 600, 1200, or 2400 baud)
RS-232C Synchronous (0 to 9600 baud)
a RS-232C Asynchronous (four rates of 75, 150, 300,
600, 1200, or 2400 baud)
NTDS Slow, Fast, and ANEW in a normal or
intercomputer mode
Options Available
* 8K-word Memory Modules (up to 65K-words)
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* Additional 16 General Registers
* Direct Memory Access (DMA) capability
* MATHPAC Modules
* Microgrowth Card
* Special Tools Kit
* Spare Parts Kit (one year supply)
* Different Bootstrap Cards
* Dp to 16 I/O channels in four channel groups
options as specified above plus:
NTDS Serial (32-bit)

















































































































































































































































































































Two - Kernal & Supervisor
Yes
128K-words
0.3 to 0.98 usee
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mission and functions of, 8 October 1974.
2. Naval Material Command TADSTAND 1 MAT-09Y:EWC Serial
23, Subject: Standard Shipboard Tactical Digital
Processors and Program Language, 3 November 1971.
3. Naval Material Command TADSTAND 1 (Revision 1)
MAT-09Y:JER Serial 130, Subject: Standard Shipboard
Tactical Digital Processors and Pr ogram Lan guage , 29
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